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Managed care health insurers in the US restrict their enrollees' choice of hospitals to specific
networks. This paper investigates the causes and welfare effects of the observed hospital networks.
A simple profit maximization model explains roughly 63 per cent of the observed contracts between
insurers and hospitals. I estimate a model that includes an additional effect: hospitals that do not need
to contract with all insurance plans to secure demand (for example, providers that are capacity
constrained under a limited or selective network) may demand high prices that not all insurers are
willing to pay. Hospitals can merge to form "systems" which may also affect bargaining between
hospitals and insurance plans. The analysis estimates the expected division of profits between
insurance plans and different types of hospitals using data on insurers' choices of network. Hospitals
in systems are found to capture markups of approximately 19 per cent of revenues, in contrast to
non-system, non-capacity constrained providers, whose markups are assumed to be about zero.
System members also impose high penalties on plans that exclude their partners. Providers that are
expected to be capacity constrained capture markups of about 14 per cent of revenues. I show that
these high markups imply an incentive for hospitals to under-invest in capacity despite a median
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The e⁄ects of managed care health insurers on the price and quality of medical care have been widely
researched1. One aspect of their impact, however, has not been addressed in detail: the restriction
imposed by each insurance plan on the network of hospitals from which its enrollees can choose.
In a previous paper (Ho, 2005a), I consider the short term welfare e⁄ects of these constraints. I
estimate that restricted consumer choice of hospitals leads to a welfare loss of approximately $1.04
billion per year assuming ￿xed prices2. In this paper I analyze the process by which the contracting
equilibrium is determined, noting the e⁄ects that can generate a static welfare loss of this kind.
I also consider dynamic welfare e⁄ects. The division of the pro￿ts generated by each contract is
determined by bargaining between the hospital and the insurer. This implies an incentive for both
￿rms to invest in characteristics that will increase their leverage during the bargaining process.
This paper demonstrates one dimension on which hospitals￿investment incentives may be at odds
with consumer preferences: hospitals that expect to ￿ll their beds may have an incentive to under-
invest in capacity. I show that investment in new beds would generate a bene￿t to consumers of
over $330,000 per bed per year assuming ￿xed premiums, far outweighing the e⁄ect on hospital
and insurer pro￿ts. However, the bargaining process implies a negative incentive for capacity
constrained hospitals to invest.
I base my analysis on a dataset that de￿nes the network of every managed care plan in 43
markets across the US. On average 17 per cent of insurer-hospital pairs in my data do not arrange
contracts to provide care. The proportion varies from zero in some markets to as many as 40 per
cent in others. I de￿ne selective markets as those in which at least four of the ￿ve major plans
fail to reach agreement with at least one major hospital. By this de￿nition roughly 20 per cent of
observed markets are selective. 76% of enrollees in managed care plans do not have a free choice of
hospitals. The data therefore show that, even in markets with reasonably small numbers of insurers
1For example, Miller and Luft (1997) review ￿fteen studies of the e⁄ects of managed care on quality. They ￿nd no
compelling evidence of a reduction in quality of care, although patients show less satisfaction with managed care than
with traditional plans. Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse (2000) consider the causes of the expenditure reductions
achieved by managed care plans in the treatment of heart disease. They show that virtually all the di⁄erence in
spending between indemnity plans and HMOs comes from lower unit prices rather than the quantity of services or a
di⁄erence in health outcomes.
2As discussed in that paper, any premium increase resulting from a move to less selective hospital networks would
o⁄set this welfare loss. The overall result of the observed restricted networks may in fact be an increase in total
welfare compared to the unselective case.
2and hospitals (12 and 15 per market on average, respectively), substantial numbers of potential
contracts are not agreed upon.
I use demand estimates from my previous paper to calculate the producer surplus (de￿ned as
plan revenues less hospital costs of care) generated by each potential hospital network for each
plan in the data, taking into account patient ￿ ows across plans and hospitals. A simple analysis
shows that around 63 per cent of contractual decisions are explained by this de￿nition of producer
surplus. An understanding of the price-setting negotiation between insurers and providers is needed
to explain the rest of the data. I discuss the intuition that explains how the potential for price
discrimination by hospitals, made possible by consumers￿ability to move across plans, can in￿ uence
contractual decisions even holding surplus ￿xed. The intuition applies to hospitals that are highly
di⁄erentiated from their peers or that expect to be capacity constrained and to groups of providers
that have merged to form hospital systems. In addition, system hospitals may e⁄ectively force plans
to contract with all or none of the hospitals in the system. Reduced form analysis is consistent
with these predictions.
I also discuss short term welfare e⁄ects. The selective equilibrium can be ine¢ cient even when
the excluded hospital is full at equilibrium and the consumers with the highest value for it are
the ones treated. The ine¢ ciency is generated because consumers are forced to make sub-optimal
choices across insurers in order to access their preferred hospital. The resulting loss of consumer
welfare may outweigh the bene￿t derived when the highest-valuation patients are given preferential
access to the hospital3.
I estimate the pro￿ts secured by di⁄erent types of hospitals using data on insurers￿choices of
hospital networks and insurer and hospital characteristics. This is a two-sided matching problem
with heterogeneous agents. The analysis is complicated by the existence of multiple potential equi-
libria and by problems with endogenous regressors. Several recent papers develop methodologies
that address these issues. However, their approaches often make restrictive assumptions regarding
the nature of the unobservables and most are feasible only for problems involving small numbers of
￿rms4. This paper adopts a di⁄erent approach developed in Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2005) in
3This is the welfare e⁄ect estimated in Ho (2005a). The restriction of consumer choice of hospitals, and the
resulting distortion of their choice of plans, imply a welfare loss of $1.04 billion per year assuming ￿xed prices.
4For example, Seim (2001), Andrews, Berry and Jia (2004) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) all propose methods to
analyze market entry problems. Fox (2005) and Sorensen (2005) set out estimation methods for two-sided matching
problems. However, Sorensen￿ s nested solution method is infeasible in the large markets studied here, while Fox￿ s
3which plans choose their networks in a simultaneous-moves game conditional on their expectations
regarding other plan choices and the prices demanded by hospitals. The equilibrium implicitly
establishes markups for a hospital￿ s services that are functions of the characteristics of the hospital
itself and the distribution of consumer, hospital, and plan characteristics in the particular market.
I estimate the markups of three speci￿c hospital types: those that expect to be capacity con-
strained, "star" hospitals (providers that are very attractive to consumers) and those that are
members of hospital systems. I ￿nd that hospitals with exogenous characteristics predicting capac-
ity constraints capture $1800 per patient treated more than other providers. This implies markups
of approximately 14 per cent of revenues, in contrast to non-system, non-capacity constrained
providers, which I assume receive approximately zero markups. The pro￿ts of hospitals in systems
are approximately $140,000 per month higher than other providers; this translates to a markup of
about 19 per cent of revenues. They also charge high penalties from plans that contract with some
but not all of the hospitals in their system. The results are therefore consistent with several recent
papers that suggest that hospital mergers may prevent plans from using the threat of exclusions to
control prices5. Star hospitals may also capture high pro￿ts but these are imprecisely estimated. In
addition, I ￿nd that hospitals with low costs have higher markups than their competitors, consistent
with simple bargaining models.
Finally, I outline the implications of the results. The methodology used in this paper does not
fully detail how the multiplicity of possible equilibria is resolved. Instead my analysis provides a
reduced form characterization of the markup equation that is generated by the equilibrium that
does materialize. More precise details of the bargaining game would be needed to determine how
that equilibrium is chosen and this would be required before I could provide a detailed analysis
of counterfactuals. I do, however, analyze the relationship between hospital characteristics and
markups. This provides helpful information for assessing which bargaining models best describe
the hospital-insurer price negotiation. To the extent that policy and environmental changes do not
a⁄ect the reduced form relationship, the results can also be used to predict how changes in market
characteristics are likely to a⁄ect hospital markups.
The dynamic welfare e⁄ects implied by the estimates are considered in this spirit. In particular
simpler methodology does not permit an analysis of the division of pro￿ts between upstream and downstream ￿rms.
5See, for example, Lesser and Grinsburg (2001), Mays, Hurley and Grossman (2003), and Capps and Dranove
(2004).
4I predict the impact of hospital investment to remove capacity constraints, assuming no e⁄ect of
this change on plan networks or other market characteristics6. The investment would result in
a median bene￿t to consumers of $0.17 per person per new bed per year, or $331,890 per year
per additional bed for the market as a whole. Insurer pro￿ts would increase as a result of the
change. However, I ￿nd that the hospital markups generated by capacity constraints outweigh the
additional revenues from new patients and imply that, at least in the short term, these providers
have no incentive to invest to remove their constraints. The results demonstrate that hospitals may
bene￿t from arti￿cially restricting their capacity below the level that would be observed in a world
without bargaining and that this may signi￿cantly reduce consumer surplus.
Several strands of the health economics literature are relevant to this paper. A number of
authors demonstrate that the prices paid by plans to hospitals are consistent with simple bargaining
models7. Gal-Or (1997, 1998) develops a Nash bargaining model in a two-plan, two-hospital setting.
Vistnes (2000) has a model of two-stage competition between hospitals: providers compete ￿rst for
preferential acesss to health plans and then for individual patients. Finally, Eggleston, Norman and
Pepall (2004) use a similar theoretical framework in a market containing health plans, hospitals and
physician groups to look at the e⁄ects of horizontal and vertical integration on prices. However, no
previous empirical papers have addressed the determinants of the observed network choices or the
e⁄ect of the contractual process on long term investment incentives.
In the next two sections I describe the contractual process between insurers and hospitals and
introduce the dataset. Section 4 outlines the demand estimates from Ho (2005a) and uses them
to generate a measure of surplus. Section 5 discusses the intuition regarding bargaining; Section
6 contains reduced form results; and Section 7 introduces the full empirical model. Results and
counterfactuals are given in Sections 8 and 9 and the ￿nal section concludes.
6I assume that hospital capacity is determined prior to the contracting process and that the relationship identi￿ed
between capacity constraints and hospital markups is causal. See Section 2 for a discussion of the rationale for this
assumption.
7Most of these regress the prices paid to hospitals on measures of hospital and plan bargaining power. Examples
are Brooks, Dor and Wong (1996), Zwanziger and Mooney (2000) and Feldman and Wholey (2001). In addition,
Town and Vistnes (2001) and Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2004) both investigate the e⁄ect of the hospital￿ s
value to consumers on its pro￿ts. They estimate consumer preferences over hospitals and regress hospital pro￿ts or
prices on variables that summarize consumer demand for the hospital.
52 Industry Background and Assumptions
Each year, every privately insured consumer in the US chooses a health plan, generally from a
menu o⁄ered by his employer8. The insurer contracts with hospitals and physicians to provide any
care needed during the year. When the consumer requires medical care, he may visit any of the
providers listed by the health plan, and receive services at zero charge or after making a small
out-of-pocket payment.
There is some variety in the restrictiveness of di⁄erent types of managed care plan. If an
individual is insured by a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) he may visit only the hospitals
in that plan￿ s network. Point of Service (POS) plan enrollees can visit out-of-network hospitals
but only if referred by a Primary Care Physician. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and
indemnity plans are the least restrictive insurers: enrollees do not need a PCP referral to visit an
out-of-network hospital, although PPOs may impose ￿nancial penalties for doing so, for example
in the form of increased copayments or deductibles. The focus of this paper is on HMO and POS
plans, since their network choices have the strongest e⁄ect on both consumers and hospitals; 53 per
cent of the privately-insured population was enrolled in an HMO/POS plan in 2000.
Every HMO/POS plan contracts separately with every hospital in its network. The exact form
of the contracts varies but all specify a price to be paid to the provider per unit of care (for example
a price per inpatient day or per diagnosis-related group (DRG)). Prices vary both across providers
for a given insurer and across insurers for a given provider; contracts are usually renegotiated
annually9. Both parties in the negotiation need to balance consumer demand for services against
the price agreed. A health plan would prefer to contract with the hospitals that are valued by
its likely customers, particularly the customers on the margin of joining, but must also take into
account the fact that hospitals in demand may seek higher prices than their less di⁄erentiated
counterparts. Hospitals seek to maximize their returns by contracting with plans that both o⁄er
high prices and provide a steady ￿ ow of patients.
In order to model the contractual process I need to specify the timing of the di⁄erent hospital
857 per cent of the population is insured through an employer, compared to 5 per cent who purchase insurance
independently and 24 per cent in Medicare and Medicaid. (See the website www.statehealthfacts.org.)
9Prices paid to hospitals were regulated at the state level in the 1960s and 1970s. However, since Medicare and
Medicaid switched from cost-based to prospective payment systems, and managed care encouraged increased price
competition between hospitals, rate regulation has virtually disappeared. It remains only in Maryland: markets in
this state are excluded from my supply-side analysis.
6and plan decisions. The stages of my model are as follows:
Stage 1: Plans and hospitals agree on contracts
Stage 2: Plans set premiums
Stage 3: Consumers and employers jointly choose plans
Stage 4: Sick consumers visit hospitals; plans pay hospitals per service provided
My main focus is on Stage 1. I assume ￿xed premiums throughout most of my calculations; I
include a robustness test to consider the e⁄ects of potential premium adjustments in Section 8. I
analyze Stages 3 and 4 in Ho (2005a): my methodology is outlined in section 4.1 and the results of
that study are incorporated where necessary in this paper.
A few additional comments are in order. First, I assume that the plan￿ s choice of quality
and products, together with the hospital￿ s choices of capacity, location, services and quality, are
made prior to Stage 1. My analysis conditions on these decisions. I therefore do not explicitly
model issues such as product-based price discrimination (the plan￿ s choice between HMO and POS
products can be seen as a way of dividing the market into segments with di⁄erent price elasticities
of demand) and the hospital￿ s decision regarding investment in new capacity given that o⁄ered by
its competitors. Similarly, I assume that hospital merger decisions are made prior to the contractual
process10. Second, I focus on inpatient care. According to the American Hospital Association, 65%
of hospital revenues in 2001 were derived from inpatient care; the remainder came from outpatient
services.
My dataset contains no exclusive contracts (either hospitals reaching agreement exclusively
with a single insurer or vice versa) and few vertically integrated organizations. Many hospitals
and insurers attempted vertical integration in the 1990s but this has become increasingly rare
in recent years. The literature implies that the breadth of skills needed to run both a hospital
and a plan is too large for the vertically integrated model to be viable except in very speci￿c
10These assumptions seem reasonable because the relevant variables change more slowly over time than hospital-
insurer contracts. For example, over 90% of hospitals did not alter their o⁄erings of angioplasty, ultrasound, open
heart surgery or neonatal intensive care units over the four-year period 1997-2001; 70 percent of hospitals changed
their capacity levels by fewer than 20 beds over the same four-year period. The correlation between market-level
bed capacity (beds per thousand population) in 1980 and that in 2001 is 0.63. Plan product o⁄erings and hospital
locations are similarly static. Hospital-insurer contracts, in contrast, are usually renegotiated annually. My goal
is to estimate the short-term e⁄ects of these hospital and plan characteristics on equilibrium contracts. Long-term
investment decisions regarding capacity are considered in Section 9.
7circumstances11. The key exception to this pattern is Kaiser Permanente, a dominant HMO in
California and elsewhere that owns a large number of hospitals. I do not attempt to explain the
vertical integration phenomenon in this paper. I condition on the existence of Kaiser health plans
and hospitals in my analysis of both the supply and demand sides of the market (since they are
important members of the plan and hospital choice sets, particularly in California) but exclude
them from my models of ￿rm behavior.
The health plan must take state and federal legislation into account when choosing its providers.
Many states have implemented Any Willing Provider laws which prohibit health insurers from
excluding quali￿ed health care providers that are willing to accept the plans￿terms and conditions.
However, these regulations have been argued to remove the bene￿ts of managed care, since they
prevent plans from trading volume for lower provider prices. Perhaps for this reason they apply to
hospitals in only seven states (in other areas they are largely limited to pharmacies). I have data
covering two markets within these states; I ￿nd that plans are just as likely to exclude hospitals
in these markets as elsewhere. I therefore assume that these regulations have no impact on plan
decisions in the markets I consider. In addition, some states have implemented Essential Community
Provider laws, which require insurers to contract with providers that o⁄er "essential community
services", such as public hospitals and teaching hospitals, and to contract with enough hospitals
to serve the needs of the local population. I assume these regulations do not a⁄ect the decision of
a plan to exclude any particular hospital since consumer demand forecasts would prevent it from
dropping too many hospitals in any case.
3 The Dataset
This paper pulls together information from several datasets. I take data on the characteristics of
health insurers from two datasets from Atlantic Information Services12. The data cover all managed
care insurers in 43 major markets across the US for Quarters 3 and 4 of 200213. I supplement this
11See, for example, Burns and Pauly (2002) and Burns and Thorpe (2000)
12These are The HMO Enrollment Report and HMO Directory 2002. Both are based on plan state insurance ￿lings.
13The markets are: Atlanta GA, Austin TX, Baltimore MD, Boston MA, Bu⁄alo NY, Charlotte NC, Chicago IL,
Cincinnati OH, Cleveland OH, Columbus OH, Dallas TX, Denver CO, Detroit MI, Fort Worth TX, Houston TX,
Indianapolis IN, Jacksonville FL, Kansas City MO, Las Vegas NV, Los Angeles CA, Miami FL, Milwaukee WI,
Minneapolis MN, New Orleans LA, Norfolk VA, Oakland CA, Orange County CA, Orlando FL, Philadelphia PA,
Phoenix AZ, Pittsburgh PA, Portland OR, Sacramento CA, St. Louis MO, Salt Lake City UT, San Antonio TX, San
Diego CA, San Francisco CA, San Jose CA, Seattle WA, Tampa FL, Washington DC, and West Palm Beach FL.
8information with data from the Weiss Ratings￿Guide to HMOs and Health Insurers for Fall 2002.
Data on plan performance comes from the Health Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS)
and the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans (CAHPS) 2000, both of which are published by
the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA). These data measure clinical performance
and patient satisfaction in 1999. Hospital characteristics are taken from the American Hospital
Association (AHA) dataset for 2001 and from the MEDSTAT Marketscan Research Database for
1997-98. My previous paper, Ho (2005a), uses all these datasets: further details on the data,
and the methodology used to create additional variables (such as plan market shares) that are
employed again in this analysis, are given there. My demand estimation includes all 665 hospitals
and all 516 managed care plans in the data. When I consider the supply side I exclude one of the
43 markets, Baltimore MD, since the state of Maryland sets hospital prices centrally rather than
permitting the plan-hospital bargaining analyzed here. In the remaining 42 markets I consider
only non-Kaiser plans for which premiums are observed; I also exclude a few extremely selective
insurers that I regard as outliers14. The remaining data contain 441 plans in total15. I model these
plans￿contracts with all non-Kaiser hospitals in each market: there are 633 hospitals in total in
the supply-side dataset. I condition on the observed contracts of each excluded plan and hospital
in each market.
Descriptive statistics for the hospitals and plans in the data are given in Tables 1 and 2 respec-
tively. The hospitals have 339 beds and 1.26 registered nurses per bed on average; 20% are teaching
hospitals. The average market share of the HMO/POS plans in the dataset is 3%16. Premiums
average $141 per member per month. 35% of insurers are POS plans; 76% have been in existence
for over 10 years. Plan performance scores vary widely, from an average rating of 0.15 (for the
percent of children receiving all required doses of MMR, Hepatitis B and VZV vaccines before their
13th birthday) to an average of 0.73 (the proportion of women aged 52-69 who had received a
14I exclude plans that drop more than four of the top six hospitals because these may have di⁄erent reasons for
their contracting decisions than other plans in the data. I also exclude two speci￿c outliers: Scott and White Health
Plan of Austin, TX and Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound. These are di⁄erent from most other plans in the
market in that they are locally-based, consumer-driven insurers that are heavily focused on primary care.
15The supply side analysis includes a prediction of plan market shares given the networks o⁄ered by every plan in
the market. I condition on the existence of "excluded" plans (Kaiser plans, those that are very selective and those
for which premiums are unobserved) when calculating the shares of the plans that are modelled explicitly. I also
take account of indemnity and PPO plans, making assumptions about their characteristics, and allow consumers to
choose the outside option of being uninsured, as described in detail in Ho (2005a).
16Shares are measured as percent of the nonelderly population in the market.
9mammogram within the previous two years). The two most frequently-occurring plans are Aetna
and CIGNA, with 15% and 10% of observations respectively.
The ￿nal dataset analyzed in this paper de￿nes the network of hospitals o⁄ered to enrollees
by every HMO/POS plan in every market considered in March/April 2003. The information was
collected from individual plan websites; missing data were ￿lled in by phone. Figure 1 documents
the observed variation across both markets and plans in the extent to which plans exclude major
hospitals from their networks17. Markets are categorized on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the
least selective, indicating that each of the ￿ve largest plans (by enrollment) contracts with all eight
largest hospitals (by number of admissions). In markets ranked 5, at least four of the largest plans
exclude at least one major hospital; the other categories lie between these extremes. Markets are
fairly evenly spread across the ￿ve categories: 15 markets are ranked 1 or 2 (not selective) and 21
are ranked 4 or 5 (very selective). The ￿gure also shows the distribution of plans by the number
of major hospitals excluded and the variation in this distribution across types of market. Plans￿
selective behavior varies widely: 208 plans exclude no major hospitals, but 62 plans exclude at least
four of the eight major hospitals in their markets.
Table 3 compares the means of a number of market characteristics in selective and unselec-
tive markets. There are few signi￿cant di⁄erences. Selective markets do not have signi￿cantly
smaller populations, higher managed care penetration, more hospitals, or more beds per capita
than unselective markets and are not clustered geographically. There are no signi￿cant demo-
graphic di⁄erences. The only di⁄erence that is signi￿cant at p=0.05 (or in fact at p=0.2) is the
standard deviation of the distances between hospitals in the market. Plans seem to be more willing
to exclude hospitals in areas where hospitals are clustered into several groups, perhaps because
each provider in a given group is a reasonable substitute for the others. The raw data therefore
do not o⁄er an obvious explanation for the observed variation; however, they do provide a hint
that demand e⁄ects may be important. These are taken into account in the analysis described in
Section 4.
The hospital-level data o⁄er further clues to help explain the observed contracting choices.
Table 4 de￿nes four variables that summarize the services o⁄ered by each hospital. The summary
variables cover cardiac services, imaging, cancer and birth services. Each hospital is rated on a
17Figure 1 and Table 3 both exclude Baltimore MD.
10scale from 0 to 1, where 1 implies that the hospital o⁄ers the least common of a list of relevant
services and 0 implies that it o⁄ers none of the services. I interact these variables with consumer
characteristics in the model of demand for hospitals. They can also be used to investigate which
hospital characteristics are correlated with market share. Table 5 sets out the results of a regression
of hospital market shares on hospital characteristics. All four service variables, and the indicator for
teaching hospitals, are positively and signi￿cantly related to market share. Together with hospital
location, they will be key determinants of hospital capacity constraints (which, as we shall see,
generate market power and the ability to negotiate positive pro￿t margins) later in the analysis.
4 E⁄ect of the Network on Total Plan and Hospital Pro￿ts
4.1 Demand Estimates
In order to understand the equilibrium network outcomes I need to analyze Stages 3 and 4 of the
model, in which consumers choose their health plans taking into account the hospitals they expect
to visit in the coming year. The parameter estimates generated in Ho (2005a) are used as an input
to this paper￿ s supply side analysis. The demand estimation process has three stages:
1. The ￿rst step is to estimate demand for hospitals using a discrete choice model that allows
for observed di⁄erences across individuals. With some probability consumer i (whose type is
de￿ned by age, gender, and zipcode tabulation area (ZCTA)) becomes ill. His utility from
visiting hospital h given diagnosis l is given by:
uihl = ￿h + xh￿ + xh￿il￿ + "ihl
where xh, ￿h are vectors of observed and unobserved hospital characteristics respectively, ￿il
are observed characteristics of the consumer such as diagnosis and location and "ihl is an
idiosyncratic error term assumed to be iid Type 1 extreme value18. Hospital characteristics
include location, the number of beds, the numbers of nurses and doctors per bed and details
of services o⁄ered, ownership, and accreditation. This equation is estimated using stan-
dard maximum likelihood techniques and micro (encounter-level) data from the MEDSTAT
18This model was ￿rst proposed in McFadden (1973).
11MarketScan Research Database for 1997-98. The data provide information on the hospital
admissions of indemnity plan and PPO enrollees19.
2. Secondly, I use the estimated coe¢ cients to predict the utility provided by each plan￿ s hospital
network. Individual i￿ s expected utility from the hospital network o⁄ered by plan j in market









exp(￿h + xh^ ￿ + xh￿il^ ￿)
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where pil is the probability that individual i will be hospitalized with diagnosis l.
3. Finally, I use aggregate data from Atlantic Information Services, the NCQA and the AHA to
estimate the health plan demand model. I use a methodology similar to that set out in Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). The utility of individual i from plan j in market m is given by:




where zjm and ￿jm are observed and unobserved plan characteristics respectively, premjm are
plan premiums, yi is the income of individual i, and !ijm represents idiosyncratic shocks to
consumer tastes, again assumed to be iid Type 1 extreme value. I consider HMO and POS
plans only20. The characteristics included in z are premium, the size of the physician network,
plan age, a list of eight clinical quality variables (taken from the NCQA￿ s HEDIS dataset) and
two variables summarizing consumer assessment of plans on dimensions such as availability of
needed care and speed with which care is received (from their CAHPS dataset). The results
of this stage of the analysis are reproduced in Table 6. I ￿nd that consumers place a positive
and signi￿cant weight on their expected utility from the hospital network when choosing a
plan. The coe¢ cient magnitudes imply that a one standard deviation increase in expected
19It would be preferable to estimate consumers￿hospital choices using data for managed care enrollees. However,
this is not feasible because the available data do not identify the hospital networks o⁄ered by each managed care plan,
so the choice sets of managed care enrollees are unobserved. Instead I consider the choices made by indemnity and
PPO enrollees, whose choice set is unrestricted. I assume that indemnity/PPO enrollees have the same preferences
over hospitals as HMO/POS enrollees, conditional on their diagnosis, income and location. I test this assumption
using data for HMO/POS enrollees in Boston; see Ho (2004) for details.
20I include two additional potential choices for each consumer: an indemnity/PPO plan option, de￿ned using
assumptions about the characteristics of these insurers in each market, and the outside option of being uninsured.
12utility is equivalent to a reduction in premium of $39 per member per month (a little less
than one standard deviation).
4.2 Producer Surplus Generated by the Network
With the demand estimates in hand, I now move on to consider the observed health plan-hospital
contracts. The simplest model of pair-wise contracting assumes that each insurer-provider pair
bargains independently over the division of a surplus of size M. The implication (whatever the
bargaining framework used) is that ￿rms reach agreement if and only if M > 0. I investigate this
theory by using my demand estimates to predict the producer surplus generated by each insurance
plan when it contracts with each potential hospital network: that is, the total pro￿t to be divided
between the plan and all the hospitals with which it contracts. The producer surplus generated by















where ni is the population in consumer-type cell i (de￿ned by ZCTA, age, and gender), pi is the
probability that a type-i person will be admitted to hospital, costh is the average cost of treatment
at hospital h, and premjm is plan j￿ s premium in market m. The quantities sijm(Hj;H￿j) and
sih(Hj) are plan j￿ s and hospital h￿ s predicted shares of type-i people when networks Hj and H￿j
are o⁄ered by plan j and other plans respectively. These are predicted using the demand estimates
and take account of the ￿ ow of consumers across plans, and across hospitals given their choice of
plans, in response to network changes.
The surplus de￿nition does not include plans￿non-hospital variable costs. Each plan faces a
number of costs of enrolling consumers: these include payments to primary care physicians and pre-
scription drug costs, for example, in addition to the costs of treatment at hospitals. Unfortunately,
I do not have access to data on plan variable costs and therefore cannot include them in the surplus
term21. I take some steps towards accounting for this issue later in the analysis by estimating the
cost of enrolling consumers directly. The details of this robustness test are discussed in Section 7.
21The analysis does allow for the existence of additional ￿xed costs, since these would cancel out when we consider
the surplus change from a change in networks.
13The calculation takes account of hospital capacity constraints. If any network combination
implies that any hospital is over 85 per cent of its maximum capacity level, I reallocate patients
randomly to non-capacity constrained hospitals in the market. I assume that patients are treated
in the order in which they arrive and that the timing of sickness is random: each plan therefore
has the same percentage of enrollees reallocated for any given capacity constrained hospital. The
adjustment a⁄ects patients￿hospital choices and therefore their predicted costs of care but does
not impact consumers￿choices of plan or premium levels22.
Premiums are assumed ￿xed in this calculation. In reality, when plan j considers a deviation
from its observed network, it probably predicts that its own premium and those of other plans will
adjust in response to the network change. I cannot estimate these adjustments accurately since I
do not yet have a model for the prices paid to hospitals after a network change. I also encounter
data limitations: I do not have access to panel data and so cannot observe the reaction of plan
premiums to network changes over time. However, I include a robustness test for the ￿xed premium
assumption; this is discussed in Section 8.
4.3 Does the Producer Surplus Term Explain the Observed Contracts?
The next step is to use the producer surplus estimates to identify the surplus, to be divided between
the insurer and all hospitals in its network, that is generated by each potential contract. I repeat
this calculation for each of the 6747 potential contracts between the 441 plans and the 633 hospitals
in the data, keeping all other plans￿networks ￿xed. The results are summarized in Table 7. I ￿nd
that the estimated producer surplus generated by the contract (￿Surplus, the total surplus with
the contract less that without it) is greater than zero for 68 per cent of the 5587 agreed contracts.
The surplus that would be created by the contract is less than zero for just 39 per cent of the 1160
potential contracts that were not agreed upon23. So the simplest hypothesis explains the data in
22A hospital is predicted to be over 85% of maximum capacity if predicted admissions * average length of stay at
the hospital is greater than 85% of the number of beds * 365 days. By using the surplus variable without adjusting
consumers￿choices of plan, I am assuming that the plan does not expect consumers to predict their probability of
treatment at each hospital in its network when choosing their insurer. Instead consumers are expected to assume they
will have access to every hospital on the list. Consumers may update this belief if a hospital is consistently capacity
constrained (although many of the non-Medicare, non-Medicaid enrollees considered in this paper will have little
experience of seeking hospital treatment on which to base their updates). Unfortunately, without a panel dataset,
there is no variation in the data to identify the extent of any such updating.
23The histogram of the ￿Surplus variable for agreed contracts is very similar to that for contracts that were not
agreed upon. The means are $0.040 million and $0.039 million per month respectively, with variances of $0.24 million
and $0.13 million. The di⁄erence in means is not signi￿cant at p=0.2.
14approximately 63 per cent of cases. One way to interpret the ￿t of this simple model is to calculate
a pseudo-R2 measure. If we place equal weight on correctly predicting the set of observed contracts
and the set that are not observed, the pseudo-R2 is just 0.3324.
It is worth noting here that my de￿nition of producer surplus measures the e⁄ect of the contract
on the pro￿ts to be divided between the plan and all the hospitals in its network. That is, I take
account of the e⁄ect of a particular contract on the plan￿ s pro￿ts from other hospitals with which
it already has contracts. I do not, however, account for the other relevant externality: the fact that
if a hospital agrees on a contract with one plan this will a⁄ect consumer ￿ ows and therefore its
revenues and pro￿ts from other plans in its market. This interaction between the negotiations of
particular plans may well explain why my producer surplus measure imperfectly predicts the data.
The discussion in the next section considers this issue in more detail25.
5 The Price Negotiation
The producer surplus results rationalize some but not all of the variation in the data. We would
like to explain the 32 per cent of contracts agreed upon when the predicted surplus increase is
negative and the 61 per cent not agreed upon when ￿Surplus is positive26. To do so we need
to consider the price negotiations which determine how the producer surplus is divided between
insurers and hospitals. This section provides some intuition on the e⁄ect of these negotiations on
equilibrium contracts. The goal is to justify my focus on particular hospital characteristics in the
empirical analysis.
Consider a simple example of the negotiation in Stage 1 of the four-stage game set out in Section
2. Insured consumers receive two types of service from their plan: acute care from the hospitals
in the network and preventive services from the plan￿ s primary care physicians (PCPs). Hospitals
24The pseudo-R




(yi￿￿ yi)2, where yi is the observed outcome, ^ yi is its predicted probability, and
￿ yi is the mean value in the data. This is the same measure used to assess goodness of ￿t in Stata￿ s logit and probit








(yi￿￿ yi)2, where Ni is the number of times the i￿ th alternative is observed in the data.
25The fact that my producer surplus measure does not fully explain the data does not necessarily imply that the
outcome does not maximize total producer surplus, nor that it is ine¢ cient. However, the discussion in Section 5
notes that an ine¢ cient outcome is possible.
26Two assumptions made in the surplus calculation may help rationalize the contracts: the assumptions of ￿xed
premiums and zero plan non-hospital variable costs. Both assumptions will be addressed in robustness tests of the
full empirical model.
15and plans bargain over the prices to be paid to the hospitals for treating the plans￿enrollees. When
a hospital-plan pair has agreed on a contract, the hospital is required to treat every enrollee from
the plan who requests care, provided it has spare capacity. Each plan then sets a single premium
level and consumers choose their plans for the year.
Not much is known about the exact form of the bargaining process used, how much it varies
across plan-hospital pairs or across markets, or the extent of asymmetric information between
insurers and hospitals. Interviews with plan and hospital representatives who are involved in
contractual negotiations suggest that plans often have the ￿nal decision rights over whether to agree
to contracts. The simplest bargaining model with this property has hospitals making simultaneous
take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers to all plans in the market and plans choosing whether to accept these
o⁄ers. I therefore consider this model as the leading case and use it in the empirical estimation of
Section 7. However, other models with this property may be possible27 and plans may not have
decision rights in some markets. The intuition discussed here also applies to many models beyond
my leading case.
Many take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers models, including the leading case, imply that hospitals that
are undi⁄erentiated and that do not expect to be full receive zero pro￿ts. Plans capture 100%
of the surplus created and will include hospital h in their networks provided it generates positive
producer surplus. Evidence from the interviews I conducted indicates that this may be a reasonable
representation of many markets where managed care is strong and hospitals compete for contracts.
The Executive Director of one hospital system described a potential outcome in such markets:
"There are examples where there were too many hospitals in an area and the plans
played them o⁄ against each other to the point where the price paid was no more than
marginal cost."
The more interesting situation arises when hospitals tailor their characteristics in order to
capture positive pro￿ts. Interviewees noted that the negotiations could be very di⁄erent in these
markets. A hospital Director said the following:
"In market X [where hospitals are very strong], the prices [the best hospitals] charge
27For example, Ho (2005b) discusses and solves a simple model with no uncertainty. Plans make take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄ers to hospitals. Their perfect information regarding hospital and plan characteristics implies that they only make
o⁄ers that they know will be accepted.
16are based on their very high patient satisfaction results and their strong reputation.
They can get high prices from any plan in the market and they don￿ t need them all."
The CEO of a small hospital in a di⁄erent market had a similar story:
"Large [hospitals] in this market can dictate whatever prices they want. The bigger
names can demand the higher prices."
The intuition needed to help explain the data derives from the fact that consumers may be
willing to switch plans if necessary to access these popular hospitals. These providers may choose
to price discriminate by charging high prices that not all plans are willing to pay28. The e⁄ect
follows most clearly for three types of hospitals:
1. The hospital may be su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated from its competitors that all or most consumers
are willing to pay more for its services than for other hospitals in the market and are willing to
change plans to access it. This is most likely for hospitals that o⁄er very high-tech services,
teaching hospitals, and hospitals with a high reputation for quality29. I describe these as
"star" hospitals. I discuss in Section 7 the characteristics used to de￿ne these providers in
the empirical estimation.
2. The hospital may be somewhat di⁄erentiated from its competitors and may expect to be
capacity constrained: that is, it may expect to ￿ll its beds without treating all consumers
who wish to access it. In many models this implies two e⁄ects. First, capacity constrained
hospitals are particularly likely to choose to contract selectively because this strategy acts
as a pro￿table form of rationing, helping the hospital to avoid lower-valuation consumers
who would otherwise displace those with a higher willingness-to-pay30. Second, the capacity
28This intuition is similar to a monopolist which restricts volume in order to maximize pro￿ts. Perfect price
discrimination across consumers is impossible because enrollees are aggregated into plans, each of which charges a
single premium, and may choose to move between plans. One e⁄ect of selective contracting is to concentrate high-
valuation consumers into the plans that are willing to pay the highest prices, increasing the hospital￿ s revenues per
patient treated and also potentially its total pro￿ts.
29Hospital location also plays an important role in di⁄erentiating the provider from its competitors. However,
location alone may not be su¢ cient to generate "star" hospital status.
30The capacity constraints make a hospital more likely, all else equal, to choose to contract selectively. They may
also improve the hospital￿ s ability to negotiate selective contracts, acting as a commitment device to persuade plans
that no further arrangements will be made with other insurers in the market. Both e⁄ects make capacity constrained
providers more likely than other similar hospitals to post high prices that not all plans are willing to pay.
17constraint may alter the nature of the bargaining game, essentially forcing plans to compete
for contracts with the hospital and pushing its prices up even further31.
3. Finally, if a su¢ ciently large proportion of the hospitals in the market merge to form a single
system, the combined organization may be very attractive to consumers and the number of
competitors that remain may be small. This too may imply that many consumers are willing
to switch plans to access the system and that selective contracting increases its pro￿ts.
In all three cases a given insurer may choose to exclude the hospital, focusing instead on those
consumers whose low valuation for h and higher valuation for its other services prevents them from
switching, if other plans have a higher maximum willingness-to-pay for the contract32. The e⁄ect
of consumers￿willingness to move across plans is important here. The value of ￿Surplus generated
by a contract may be positive, but if the price demanded by the hospital (and which other plans
are willing to pay) is high enough to prevent the plan from capturing any pro￿ts, the contract will
not be agreed upon. Enrollees with a particularly high valuation for the hospital will switch plans
to access it. A selective equilibrium emerges because of these interactions between the contracts
negotiated by di⁄erent plans in the market.
The existence of systems may also help to explain the contracts that are agreed upon despite a
negative incremental surplus. I observe in the data that some plans contract with some but not all
members of a hospital system, but this practice is infrequent. I rationalize this observation with the
idea that, if a hospital system has signi￿cant market power (as in point 3.), it may impose penalties
on plans that contract with some but not all of its members. Even systems with little market power
may choose a bundling strategy, charging relatively more for contracts with individual hospitals
than for those with the entire organization, to maximize the surplus captured from each plan. In
both cases plans may be deterred from cherry-picking from the members of a system33.
31This bene￿t may prompt particular hospitals to choose to be capacity constrained; this is the issue analyzed in
Section 9.2. The intuition in the case where hospitals make o⁄ers to plans is similar to that in Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983). Allowing ￿rms to choose capacity levels before bargaining begins permits them to move from Bertrand to
Cournot competition, implying positive hospital pro￿ts. The case where plans make o⁄ers to hospitals is demonstrated
in Ho (2005b).
32A particular plan may be willing to pay less for the contract than other insurers for two reasons. First, it may
have a better outside option than other plans due to variation in consumers￿preferences for other plan characteristics.
Second, its non-switching enrollees may have a lower valuation for h than those in other plans.
33The e¢ cient outcome would result in the plan only contracting with hospitals with which it generated positive
surplus. A system with high market power could demand a share of the pro￿ts generated from non-system hospitals.
Some friction is required to prevent this outcome: this could be a cost of contracting that is paid once per non-system
18The selective equilibrium may have implications for welfare. The simple model in Ho (2005b)
demonstrates that it may be ine¢ cient for a plan to exclude a hospital even if that provider is
full in equilibrium and even if the consumers with the highest value for hospital h are the ones
treated. The ine¢ ciency is generated because consumers are forced to make suboptimal choices
across health plans in order to gain access to the hospital. The resulting loss of consumer welfare,
which may outweigh the gain derived when the highest-valuation patients are given preferential
access to h, would be avoided if both plans contracted with it. The intuition is similar for the
examples concerning systems and attractive hospitals34.
6 Reduced Form Analyses and Identi￿cation
The intuition outlined in Section 5 o⁄ers one possible reason why hospital-plan pairs which would
generate positive producer surplus may not reach agreement: a hospital that does not need contracts
with all plans may charge a su¢ ciently high price that only those with the highest willingness-to-pay
agree to the contract. In addition, the contracts that are agreed upon despite a negative estimated
surplus may be explained by the penalties for excluding hospitals imposed by hospital systems. The
full econometric model presented in Section 7 tests these theories by estimating the incremental
pro￿ts captured by capacity constrained providers, star hospitals, and system members. In this
section I conduct a very simple preliminary analysis to show that the patterns in the data are
consistent with the intuition.
Table 8 shows the results of a probit regression of the following form:
Pr(contract) = ￿(￿0 + ￿1system + ￿2samesysdrop + ￿3capcon)
where system is an indicator variable for membership of a hospital system and samesysdrop mea-
sures the e⁄ect of the contract on the number of other hospitals in the plan￿ s network for which
same-system members have been excluded. The ￿nal variable, capcon, is an indicator variable for
hospitals that were over 100% or over 85% of their maximum capacity in the previous year. I
hospital and only once per system, or an inability of one hospital to transfer funds to another member of the same
system to compensate it for lost revenues.
34This is the welfare e⁄ect estimated in Ho (2005a). The restriction of consumer choice of hospitals, and the
resulting distortion of their choice of plans, imply a welfare loss of $1.04 billion per year assuming ￿xed prices. The
model in Ho (2005b) shows that a welfare loss is still possible in the case where prices are permitted to adjust.
19also include market ￿xed e⁄ects. Both system variable coe¢ cients are negative and signi￿cant.
This implies that plans are less likely to agree to contracts with system hospitals than with other
providers and that they tend to contract either with an entire system or with none of its members.
The estimated capacity constraints coe¢ cients are also negative and signi￿cant, consistent with
the theories set out above35.
This regression demonstrates the variation in the data that will be used to identify the full
model. For example, the incremental pro￿ts captured by capacity constrained hospitals will be
identi￿ed using variation in the probability of agreement across capacity constrained and non-
capacity constrained providers, both within and across markets. The basic intuition is that, since
we observe capacity constrained hospitals refusing to agree to contracts more frequently than other
providers, they must demand higher pro￿ts than their competitors. The producer surplus generated
by these hospitals when they agree on contracts with particular plans provides an upper bound
on the pro￿ts they capture. The predicted producer surplus generated when they do not reach
agreement o⁄ers a lower bound on their pro￿ts. We can estimate the average pro￿t of capacity
constrained hospitals by taking averages over these observations. A similar intuition applies to
other types of hospital.
7 A Model for Estimation
7.1 The Plan Pro￿t Equation
The next step is to estimate a model that accounts for the existence of multiple potential equilibria
and the possibility of endogenous regressors. I adopt the methodology developed in Pakes, Porter,
Ho and Ishii (2005). The ￿rst step is to de￿ne the plan pro￿t equation.
The pro￿t of plan j is the surplus generated given its chosen network Hj minus its costs:
￿P
jm(Hj;H￿j) = Sjm(Hj;H￿j) ￿ cHOSP
jm (Hj;H￿j) ￿ cNONHOSP
jm (Hj;H￿j) (2)
where cHOSP
jm (Hj;H￿j) is the cost of the plan￿ s contracts with hospitals (generated by hospital
35Providers above their maximum capacity are de￿ned as those with admissions > 365*number of beds/average
length of stay. The results remain signi￿cant when I also add the change in surplus when the contract is agreed and
the cost per admission of the hospital. They are also robust to clustering the error terms by plan or by hospital.
20pro￿ts) and cNONHOSP
jm (Hj;H￿j) represents its non-hospital costs.
I assume that each hospital receives a two-part payment: a ￿xed element and a per-patient
markup, fcj;h(:) and mkj;h(:) respectively36. If prices are set by bargaining both these quantities
depend on hospital and plan threat points and are therefore functions of characteristics of the
hospital, the plan, and the market as a whole. I would ideally use a model of the plan-hospital
bargaining process to estimate their values directly. However, the fact that each ￿rm￿ s threat point
is endogenous (depending on the observed or expected outcome of all other pairs￿negotiations),
together with the number of insurers and providers bargaining in each market, makes this approach
infeasible37. Instead I adopt a simpler methodology, projecting hospital pro￿ts onto a set of hospital,
insurer and market characteristics. That is, I estimate a reduced form function that summarizes the
relationship of these variables to hospital pro￿ts38. More speci￿cally, the payment to each hospital
is:
pmtjhm(:) = fc(xj;h;m)￿1 + Njhm(Hj;H￿j)mk(xj;h;m)￿2 (3)
where xj;h;m are plan, hospital and market characteristics, ￿1 and ￿2 are parameters to be estimated,





Subtracting the sum across hospitals of the costs implied by equation (3), we obtain plan pro￿ts40
36Contracts in reality fall into at least three categories. Many plans pay hospitals on a per diem or case rate basis.
The former involves a daily charge plus a separate charge for major procedures such as open heart surgery; the latter
implies a single rate, usually for a surgery such as open heart surgery or organ transplants, that includes a speci￿ed
number of inpatient days. Capitation contracts may also be used: here a hospital receives a ￿xed payment in return
for which it provides or covers the cost of all hospital services needed by a designated population of enrollees.
37The contract between a given plan-hospital pair is a⁄ected by the outcome of the negotiations between all other
pairs in the market: for example the willingness-to-pay of other insurers and the availability and price demands of
other hospitals all depend on the outcomes of their own negotiations and all a⁄ect the threat points of both plan and
provider. Modeling this set of negotiations explicitly would be very complicated given that there are on average 12
plans and 15 insurers in each market.
38Prior approaches to analyzing the fraction of the surplus that goes to hospitals look at the marginal value of the
hospital to a network conditional on assumptions regarding the networks in existence, but do not attempt to analyze
the determinants of these networks. See for example Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2004) and Town and Vistnes
(2001).
39Note that both this number of patients and the surplus term also depend on the x￿ s: the form of the dependence
is modelled explicitly using the demand estimates from Ho (2005a).
40A number of existing papers estimate the share of the surplus captured by a given hospital as a function of
its characteristics and those of the plan and the market (conditional on the existence of the contracts; see Capps,
Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003), Town & Vistnes (2001)). An analogous methodology would estimate the plan￿ s
share of the incremental surplus created when each hospital was added to the network. The current approach is
21as:
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The fourth term in equation (4) relates to non-hospital costs. I would ideally estimate the cost of







where Njim(Hj;H￿j) is the predicted number of enrollees of type i in plan j given the equilibrium
hospital networks and ci is the cost of insuring that type (to be estimated). Unfortunately the
available data are not rich enough to estimate ci in addition to the hospital cost parameters. In
the main speci￿cation I set ci = 0 for all i, assuming that non-hospital costs have little e⁄ect on
plans￿network choices. As a robustness test I include the predicted total number of plan enrollees.
The test is discussed further in Section 8; it has little e⁄ect on the overall results.
I allow for two sources of randomness. The ￿rst is measurement error on the part of the econome-





jm(Hj;H￿j;x;￿) + ujHj: (5)
Second, the plan may predict its pro￿ts from contracting with any particular hospital with error,
perhaps because of uncertainty regarding other plans￿network choices. I denote this error ’jh. The
plan￿ s prediction of its pro￿ts from choosing network Hj can therefore be written as
E’(￿P





similar. If we write ￿
P
jm = ￿(xj;h;m)Sjm =
P
h Njh￿jh(premjm ￿ costh), where ￿jh is the share of the surplus
retained by the plan when negotiating with hospital h, and ignore plan non-hospital costs, this is equivalent to:
￿
P
jm = Sjm ￿
P
h Njh(1 ￿ ￿jh)(premjm ￿ costjh). The value estimated by the current methodology￿ s markup term
(if fcj;h(:) = 0) is mkj;h(:) = (1 ￿ ￿jh)(premjm ￿ costh). That is, in the absence of a prediction for the hospital￿ s
e⁄ect on premiums and therefore the surplus per patient, mkj;h(:) estimates not (1￿￿jh) but the average pro￿t per
patient captured by the hospital.
22where ~ H￿j and ~ x are the random variables before their realizations are known by the plan and
E(’jhjIjm) = 0 by construction.
The next step is to decide which variables to include in the expressions for ￿xed costs and
markups. The list must be parsimonious: a large number of coe¢ cients is unlikely to be identi￿ed
given the limited data available and the fairly small variation in plan choice of networks observed. I
use the intuition discussed in Section 5 to inform the choice of variables. The main ideas to be tested
are that hospitals that expect to be capacity constrained, those in systems, and those for which all
or most consumers would switch plans should be most likely to fail to agree with plans (holding
surplus ￿xed). System hospitals may also demand a higher price from a given plan if another
same-system hospital is excluded than if it is not. Finally, even very simple bargaining models
predict that lower-cost providers generate a higher total surplus, all else equal, and therefore earn
higher markups than their competitors. I account for these predictions by including the following
variables:
1. A measure of the extent to which particular hospitals are expected to be capacity constrained.
I derive an exogenous predictor of this variable by calculating the number of patients treated
at each hospital under the thought experiment that every plan contracts with every hospital
in the market41. This variable can therefore be thought of as an indicator for potentially
capacity constrained hospitals.
2. Hospitals in systems and those for which at least one same-system hospital is excluded.
3. Star hospitals: those that are highly di⁄erentiated from their competitors in the market.
I identify these hospitals using indicator variables for teaching hospitals and hospitals that
provide high-tech imaging services42. I also use the US News and World Report￿ s hospital
rankings for 200343.
41I de￿ne a hospital to be capacity constrained if the predicted number of patients exceeds the number of beds *
365 / average length of stay in the hospital.
42The imaging service considered is positron emission tomography. 22% of hospitals in the dataset provide this
service.
43US News magazine publishes an annual report giving hospital ratings for 17 di⁄erent specialties and overall.
The rating for a particular specialty summarizes scores for reputation; severity-adjusted mortality ratios; and other
care-related factors such as the number of nurses per bed and the technology available. The reputation score was
compiled by asking a random sample of board-certi￿ed physicians which ￿ve hospitals they believed to be the best
in their specialty and taking the percentage of responding physicians who cited the hospital. The overall index is a
sum of the hospital ratings for each specialty. 544 of the hospitals in the sample (86%) have an index of zero. I use
an indicator variable for the 23 hospitals (4%) with an index above 2.6.
234. A measure of hospital costs per admission44.
5. I also include a constant term in mkj;h(:): this identi￿es the average pro￿t per patient received
by non-system hospitals that are not capacity constrained.
Table 9 sets out the results of a probit regression that shows that hospital cardiac and imaging
services are key predictors of expected capacity constraints45. As noted in Section 3, these and
other hospital services are also positively and signi￿cantly related to hospital market share. This
is consistent with the intuition described in Section 5: in order to demand high prices, capacity
constrained hospitals must not just be small but also be popular with at least a subset of consumers,
implying a high value to a subset of plans.
In reality the pro￿t received by a particular provider depends not just on its own characteristics
but on those of the plan and the market. For example, the price demanded by a system hospital can
be no higher than the maximum willingness-to-pay of other plans in the market, and this depends
on the attributes of other plans, consumers, and hospitals in the area. I would ideally include
plan and market characteristics, and interactions with network attributes, to identify these e⁄ects.
However, I have di¢ culty in identifying the coe¢ cients on these terms46. It is perhaps unrealistic,
given my limited data, to hope to estimate more than the most basic e⁄ects. The results reported
therefore have no market characteristics: they identify only the average dollar pro￿t per patient
earned by each type of hospital47.
There is not enough information in the data to allow for free interactions with both the ￿xed
and the per patient component of the contracts. The results presented below are based on a
speci￿cation where the ￿xed component of the contract depends on whether the hospital is in
a system and whether another member of that system is excluded by the plan and the variable
component depends on whether the hospital is capacity constrained, whether it is a star and the
44I also tried using costs per bed per night rather than costs per admission; this generated very similar results.
45The coe¢ cients on teaching status, system membership and distance from the city center are not signi￿cant.
Distance from consumers￿homes is an important predictor of demand for hospitals but this does not imply that only
city-center hospitals, or only those located in suburban areas, are predicted to be full.
46Plan and market characteristics that are not interacted with network attributes do not vary across potential
choices for a given plan and therefore cannot a⁄ect its choice. These characteristics therefore cannot be identi￿ed
in the ￿xed cost term of the plan pro￿t equation unless interacted with network attributes. It makes more sense to
include these variables in the markup term, where they will be interacted with Njh; however, in practice there was
not enough variation in the data to generate signi￿cant coe¢ cients.
47The capacity constraints variable is calculated using the predicted allocation of patients across hospitals when
all plans o⁄er a free choice: it therefore incorporates information on market characteristics. The other variables,
however, relate only to hospital characteristics.
24cost per admission of the hospital. When I estimated models where the variables were moved across
the marginal and ￿xed components the individual coe¢ cients were often insigni￿cant but there was
little di⁄erence in the implications of the estimates.
7.2 Details on the Estimation Strategy
The standard models that might be used to estimate the plan pro￿t equation (such as the logit
model) would use the pro￿ts for the di⁄erent networks given by equation (4) and assume that
plans chose networks to maximize these pro￿ts. We would then make the additional assumption
of iid errors and estimate using maximum likelihood. However, the independence assumption may
be di¢ cult to accept for at least two reasons. First, econometrician measurement error leads to a
correlation between the errors and the other right hand side variables of the plan pro￿t equation
(such as the surplus that is observed by the econometrician). In order to account for this we
would need to know the joint distribution of the errors and the observed pro￿t determinants; we
are unlikely to have information on this joint distribution. Second, plan prediction error causes
analogous problems.
The methodology developed in Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2005), and which I use here, avoids
these problems by using a method of moments approach with inequality constraints. The method-
ology assumes that the bargaining process follows the leading model outlined in Section 5. That
is, it assumes that every hospital makes simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers to every plan in the
market and plans simultaneously choose whether to accept these o⁄ers. The primary identifying
assumption used in estimation follows immediately from this bargaining model. Plan j￿ s expected
pro￿ts from the observed network Hj must be higher than its expected pro￿ts from the alterna-
tive network formed by reversing its contract with any hospital h in the market48. I denote this
alternative network Hh
j .That is, I assume that:
E’(￿P
jm(Hj; ~ H￿j; ~ x;’;￿)jIjm) ￿ E’(￿P
jm(Hh
j ; ~ H￿j; ~ x;’;￿)jIjm) (7)
48Reversing a contract means removing the contract if it exists or introducing it if it is not observed in the data.
That is, I assume that every observed contract must increase the plan￿ s expected pro￿ts. Any contract that does not
exist in the data must decrease the expected pro￿ts of the plan that turned it down.
25for every hospital h in the market49;50. De￿ne the observed di⁄erence between the plan￿ s pro￿ts












jm(:) is de￿ned in equation (5). We will require a set of instruments zjm such that zjm￿Ijm,
the plan￿ s information set, and
E(ujHj j z) = 0: (8)
Then equation (7) implies:
E(E’(￿P
jm(Hj; ~ H￿j; ~ x;’;￿)jIjm)j z) ￿ E(E’(￿P
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where the outer expectation is taken by the econometrician. This inequality together with equation
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Note that all unobservables have dropped out of this inequality. Translating expectations into
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where M is the number of markets in the sample, nm is the number of plans in market m, ￿
is the Kronecker product operator and g(z) is any positive-valued function of z. Each market is
weighted by the square root of the number of plans in the market, since we expect less noise in the
market average for markets containing many plans. All ￿ that satisfy this system of inequalities
are included in the set of feasible parameters. If no such ￿ exists we ￿nd values that minimize the
49Several combinations of networks may satisfy this necessary condition; that is, there may be multiple potential
equilibria. This does not prevent consistent estimation of the parameter vector #: I simply search for parameters
consistent with the assumption that the observed set of networks constitute a Nash equilibrium, without attempting
to model how that equilibrium was chosen from the set of potential equilibria.
50We also require that, when one plan deviates from its observed network, the others still succeed in securing the
networks they request. This follows from the assumption of simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers.
26sum of the absolute values of the amount by which each inequality is violated.
Identi￿cation in this model comes from comparing the pro￿ts of each plan when it chooses its
observed network to those from its alternatives. For example, the identifying assumption implies
that, if the plan is observed to contract with a capacity constrained hospital, then the change in
producer surplus it expects to result from the contract must be greater than the hospital￿ s expected
pro￿ts. If the plan drops the provider, the expected change in producer surplus must be less than
those pro￿ts. Any feasible alternative networks could be used to generate these comparisons. I
consider seven inequality conditions. The ￿rst six are de￿ned by reversing the plan￿ s contracts with
each of the six largest hospitals in turn51. The seventh is an average over the analogous inequalities
for all remaining hospitals in the market52.
The instruments are required to be independent of the error terms ujHj and ’jh; they must
also be positive (to ensure that no inequalities are reversed by the interaction with z). I use the
characteristics included in the ￿xed cost and markup terms (the x￿ s) other than the cost per admis-
sion, which I omit due to concerns about measurement error. I also include indicator variables and
interactions of indicators for several market and plan characteristics. The characteristics included
are: a high number of beds per population, a high proportion of the hospitals in the market being
in systems, a high proportion of the population aged 55-64, whether the plan is local and whether
the plan has good breast cancer screening services and poor mental health services53. None of these
instruments is a function of the observed equilibrium. Each is known to the plan when it makes
its choice. Each is also correlated with x: for example, plans can more easily exclude hospitals in
markets with a younger, less sick population or with more beds per population. System hospitals
are more often excluded in markets with a high proportion of hospitals in systems. The logic is
similar for the other instruments.
Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2005) show that we can also generate inequalities from the hospital￿ s
51The largest hospitals are de￿ned by numbers of beds.
52There are at least 7 hospitals in each market in the dataset. The methodology could easily be extended to more
alternatives per plan. For example, each insurer could consider reversing two contracts at a time rather than just
one. I try including these additional alternatives as a robustness test and ￿nd little change in the overall results. I
limit my main analysis to reversing single contracts because of concern that the reduced form function for hospital
pro￿ts could change after a major network change.
53Low proportion means less than the mean percentile, except for beds per population where quartiles of the
distribution were used.









where Mh is the network of plans chosen by hospital h and M￿h is the set of networks chosen
by other hospitals in the market. Our assumptions regarding unobservables are analogous to
those for the plan pro￿t equation. The assumed take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers model implies that the
hospital expects to receive positive pro￿ts on average over all the o⁄ers it makes to plans in its
market. This assumption generates an additional inequality constraint that can be added to the
estimation procedure54;55. The additional information provided by the hospital inequality improves
the precision of the estimates considerably. I therefore report the results generated from the full
set of inequalities.
Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2005) provides a proof that the estimator is consistent for the set
of parameters identi￿ed by the model. It also contins the methodology used to generate con￿dence
intervals for the identi￿ed set of parameters. I use the simulation methodology described there,
estimating the limit distribution of the data used to de￿ne the inequalities, taking repeated draws
on this distribution and calculating a new estimate for each draw. The resulting vector of simulated
values is used to ￿nd a 95 per cent con￿dence interval56.
54The hospital pro￿t equation models how each hospital￿ s match with a particular plan a⁄ects its total pro￿ts
including those from other plans in the market (as consumers switch plans in response to network changes). That
is, we model the externalities faced by hospitals as well as those faced by plans. We also allow system hospitals to
account for the e⁄ect of each contract on the pro￿ts of the system as a whole rather than those of the individual
provider.
55An additional assumption is needed here. We require that, if a hospital deviated from its observed contracts,
this would not a⁄ect the networks of other plans and hospitals in the market. This implies that the hospital must
be able to make an alternative o⁄er to a particular plan which would prompt that plan to reverse its contract with
that hospital (turn down the contract if it is observed in the data and vice versa) without changing those with other
hospitals in the market. This assumption seems reasonable for plans that are observed to contract with all or most
providers in the area. It is more troubling for plans that contract with just a small subset of hospitals; these may
choose to respond to a high o⁄er from one hospital by replacing it with another that was not previously included in the
network. I conduct a robustness test for the e⁄ect of this assumption by replacing the hospital inequalities with those
generated by a di⁄erent condition: that the pro￿t paid by each plan to each hospital is weakly positive. The estimates
are less precise than those from the main speci￿cation but the overall results are consistent. It is also reassuring to
note that plans do in general contract with the majority of hospitals in their markets. 83% of plan-hospital pairs in
the data agree on contracts; this number rises to 91% when we consider just the 6 largest hospitals in each market.
I also exclude from the analysis any plan that drops more than four of the six largest hospitals in its area.
56The con￿dence intervals have not been adjusted to account for variance introduced by the estimated demand




The results are reported in Table 10. The estimate of ￿ for every speci￿cation was a singleton: that
is, there was no parameter vector that satis￿ed all the inequality constraints57. The ￿rst column of
the table reports results for the main speci￿cation. The point estimates all have the expected sign.
Four of the ￿ve coe¢ cients are signi￿cant at the traditional ￿ve per cent level; the constant term
in the markup is signi￿cant at the 18 per cent level in a one-sided test. However, the con￿dence
intervals are reasonably large. The graphs in Figure 2 show the simulated distributions of four
of the coe¢ cients. There is signi￿cant variance about the point estimates. This together with
the robustness tests noted below makes statements about precise magnitudes di¢ cult. The overall
picture, however, is very clear. Hospitals in systems take a larger fraction of the surplus and also
penalize plans that do not contract with all members. Capacity constrained hospitals also capture
high markups and hospitals with higher costs per patient receive lower markups per patient than
other providers.
To help interpret the magnitudes of the results, note that the average cost per admission for
hospitals in the data is around $11,00058. The markups over these costs that I estimate vary by
cost and type of hospital. For hospitals that are neither in a system nor capacity constrained the
point estimates imply negative markups. This probably indicates that the estimated constant in
the markup term is too small. The constant is the most imprecisely estimated of all the coe¢ cients
and if one looks at its distribution (shown in Figure 3) it is easy to see that the point estimate may
well be di⁄erent from its actual value. I assume a value of 5.5 for the constant, well within the 95%
con￿dence interval, as this implies an average pro￿t of zero for non-capacity constrained hospitals
that are not in systems59. Given this, the other estimates can be interpreted as follows. Capacity
constrained hospitals receive an extra $1800 per patient which, when their costs are taken into
57As discussed in Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2004), this does not imply that we should reject the speci￿cation.
The result could easily be caused by the random disturbances in the inequalities. The probability that all inequalities
are satis￿ed can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of inequality restrictions.
58The cost variable, taken from the AHA survey 2001, is de￿ned as total hospital expenses including items such as
depreciation and interest expense.
59The Kaiser Family Foundation report "Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care Marketplace, 2004
Update" provides data on hospital costs and pro￿ts. The average community hospital payment-to-cost ratio from
private payors in 2001 was 113.2%, implying margins of 11.5% of revenues. The assumption of zero markups for
non-capacity constrained non-system hospitals implies an average pro￿t margin over all hospitals of 12%.
29account, translates into an average markup of approximately 14 per cent of revenues. Hospitals
that are not capacity constrained but are in systems capture $140,000 in incremental pro￿ts per
month per plan, which given their average patient load translates into a markup of about $2500
per patient. When costs per admission are also taken into account, system hospitals are predicted
to have average pro￿ts of around 19 per cent of revenues. I estimate a penalty of $780 per patient
for excluding a hospital from a system.
Columns 2-4 of Table 10 add the di⁄erent variables identifying star hospitals. The measure in
column 2 is an indicator variable for hospitals with a high US News Index. Column 3 uses the
variable I(teachh)(1 ￿ percent_other_teachh), an indicator for teaching hospitals multiplied by
1 - the per cent of other hospitals in the market that are teaching hospitals. Column 4 uses an
analogous variable I(imagingh)(1￿percent_other_imagingh) where I(imagingh) is an indicator
for the 22% of hospitals that o⁄er positron emission tomography. The relevant coe¢ cient in all
three speci￿cations is positive but it is never signi￿cant. However, adding these variables changes
the other coe¢ cients only slightly.
8.2 Robustness Tests
The results in the previous section are consistent with the intuition outlined in Section 5: that
hospitals in systems and those that are expected to be capacity constrained seek rents and are
optimally excluded by some plans in equilibrium. Hospitals in systems also seem to demand higher
prices from plans that exclude their partners than from other plans. Could some other e⁄ect be
causing these results? The ￿rst robustness test takes account of the non-hospital costs of enrolling
consumers60. I would like to estimate these costs for consumers of di⁄erent age or sickness levels
by including the number of each type of enrollee in the plan pro￿t equation. Unfortunately there is
not enough variation in the data to estimate more than one variable: the average cost per enrollee.
The results are reported in Table 11. The cost per enrollee is very imprecisely estimated but has
the expected positive sign. The magnitude implies a cost of $30 per member per month. The other
coe¢ cients are similar to the main speci￿cation.
60The producer surplus variable takes account of hospital costs. In particular it accounts for changes in the number
of admissions to hospital when the age or gender pro￿le of a particular plan￿ s enrollees changes. However, it does not
allow the average cost per admission of a particular hospital to vary with the age and sex of the patients admitted.
This implies an assumption that the average patient mix of each hospital is ￿xed even when plan patient mixes
change.
30Inaccuracies in the estimated demand system could cause problems with the capacity constraints
variable. For example, if the demand for hospital h is biased up, so that the surplus increase when
the hospital is added to plan j￿ s network is in￿ ated, this would also imply an upward bias on the
estimated hospital pro￿t61. This is an alternative explanation for the estimated pro￿ts of capacity
constrained hospitals: hospital h could be predicted to be full simply because its demand is biased
up; both surplus and hospital pro￿ts would then be mechanically overestimated62. I test for this by
replacing the indicator variable for predicted capacity constraints with a variable less closely tied
to the demand estimates: an indicator for hospitals that were full in the previous year. I choose not
to include this variable in the main speci￿cation because it is endogenous: any serial correlation in
the disturbance from the model would induce a bias in its coe¢ cient. However, the endogeneity
implies a negative bias, so a positive coe¢ cient is still meaningful. The results are reported in
Table 11. They are comparable to the main model: the capacity constraints coe¢ cient is smaller
than that in the main speci￿cation but still positive.
The ￿nal test concerns the assumption of ￿xed premiums. If premiums would in reality fall
when certain types of hospital were dropped then both the surplus increase from adding them, and
the hospital pro￿t needed to explain plans￿unwillingness to agree contracts, would be biased down.
As already mentioned, I cannot account perfectly for premium adjustments in response to network
changes because I do not observe premiums over time. However, I can use my estimated results
to perform a robustness test. I allow all plans to simultaneously adjust premiums to maximize
their pro￿ts (revenues less prices paid) where prices are determined by the estimates from the main
speci￿cation63. This premium adjustment is conducted as part of the producer surplus calculation
for all networks considered; the supply side estimation is then repeated using the new measure of
producer surplus. The results are reported in Table 11: they are noisier than those for the main
analysis but imply the same overall picture.
61This is particularly likely to be a problem if plan j is horizontally di⁄erentiated on a dimension not identi￿ed
by the model. In that case the plan￿ s estimated average quality would be biased up (to explain its ability to exclude
hospitals); its increase in surplus when excluded hospitals are added would also be in￿ ated. I exclude the plans that
are most clearly horizontally di⁄erentiated from the dataset: these are Kaiser Permanente, Group Health Cooperative
of Puget Sound and Scott & White Plan of Austin TX.
62This argument would not, however, explain the reduced form results for capacity constrained hospitals.
63I impose these predicted "optimal" premiums for both observed and unobserved contracts. The predicted values
are quite di⁄erent from those observed in the data. This is not surprising given the rudimentary nature of the model
used: in particular, ignoring plans￿non-hospital costs and assuming ￿xed hospital prices across types of procedure
probably generates signi￿cant noise.
31Though none of the robustness tests change the qualitative nature of the results, some of the
coe¢ cients do change in magnitude. This is consistent with the results of a number of other
robustness tests not reported here and again implies that conclusions about overall e⁄ects can be
drawn from the results but that it is di¢ cult to make statements about precise magnitudes.
One further issue should be mentioned here: I have no data on plans￿physician networks and
therefore cannot account for them in the model. It is possible that a plan might decide not to
contract with a particular hospital because this would involve establishing new physician contracts.
There is no obvious reason why these physician contracting costs should be higher for a hospital
that expects to be capacity constrained than for other hospitals but this point might go some way
to explaining the result for hospital systems. If the physician networks associated with two hospital
systems do not overlap this provides an additional incentive for a plan to contract with all of one
system or all of another rather than taking some hospitals from each. In the absence of relevant
data it is di¢ cult to say more on this issue; it may mean that the monetary costs of excluding a
same-system hospital are overstated.
Are there other possible explanations for the results set out here? We could tell a story where
teaching hospitals, or suburban providers, contracted with a subset of plans for reasons not related
to bargaining. For example, teaching hospitals might prefer to concentrate on research rather
than treating patients; suburban hospitals might only contract with the plans that covered their
particular geographical areas. If these hospitals also tended to be capacity constrained this would
confound our results. However, as shown in Table 9, neither teaching hospital status nor distance
from the city center is signi￿cantly related to predicted capacity constraints. Alternatively, it is
possible that capacity constrained hospitals turn down contracts with plans not because they wish
to drive up prices but because their costs increase when they reach full capacity. However, in that
case we should observe capacity constrained hospitals investing in new beds at a faster rate than
other providers. In fact there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the investments made by the two
types of hospitals in my data64. In addition, published data from the Kaiser Foundation show that
aggregate hospital capacity levels fell signi￿cantly between 1985 and 2000, the period of dramatic
expansion of managed care. The data also show that capacity constrained hospitals are clustered in
64Capacity constrained hospitals increased their number of beds between 1997 and 2001 by 5.4 beds (3.7%); the
equivalent value for other hospitals was 2.5 beds (3.2%). The di⁄erence is not signi￿cant at p=0.1.
32markets with small numbers of hospitals, that is in low-competition markets. Both correlations are
consistent with the idea that hospitals limit their capacity only in markets where price bargaining
is important and where they they have enough in￿ uence to capitalize on the resulting negotiating
power65.
9 Implications of the Results
9.1 Explaining the Observed Contracts
The producer surplus term considered alone explained 68 per cent of agreed contracts and 39% of
those not observed. It had a pseudo-R2 value of just 0.33 when the sets of observed and unobserved
contracts were weighted equally. We can now compare the performance of the full model to this
benchmark. I use equation (4) to predict the change in plan pro￿ts when each hospital is added to
each plan￿ s network, holding other plan choices ￿xed. I then regress this predicted pro￿t change on
hospital, insurer and market characteristics that are known to the plan when it makes its choice.
I use the estimated coe¢ cients to predict the plan￿ s expected pro￿ts from the contract. This is
the variable that should predict the observed contract choices if the model is correct66. I ￿nd that
the expected pro￿t variable explains 78 per cent of the observed contracts and 46 per cent of the
contracts that are not observed in the data, a signi￿cant improvement over the producer surplus
variable alone. The pseudo-R2 value increases to 0.5267;68.
The estimates are also consistent with evidence gathered in interviews. A number of interviewees
noted that the dominant in￿ uence on the division of the surplus belonged to insurers in some
65The Kaiser Family Foundation report "Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care Marketplace, 2004
Update" reports that total community hospital bed capacity fell from 421 to 292 beds per 100,000 population between
1985 and 2000. My data indicate that the correlation of the percent of hospitals in the market that are capacity
constrained to the number of hospitals in the market is -0.44.
66The variables included in the regression are indicator variables for hospitals in systems, teaching hospitals and
capacity constrained hospitals; US News hospital rankings; the number of beds per thousand population, number of
hospitals, number of plans and standard deviation of the distances between hospitals in the market and plan brand
dummies. All of these variables are known to the insurer when it makes its choice. I exclude hospital costs due to
concern about econometrician measurement error.
67The distribution of the expected pro￿t change variable for observed contracts is now quite di⁄erent from that
for contracts that are not agreed upon. The means are $0.103 million and $0.04 million per month respectively; the
variances are $0.017 million and $0.020 million. The di⁄erence in means is signi￿cant at p=0.01.
68It is worth noting here that we might not expect the full model to generate a dramatically higher pseudo-R
2
value than the producer surplus term alone. The surplus term accounts for the pro￿ts generated by each contract;
the full model simply adds the e⁄ect of strategic interactions between insurers and providers. These interactions may
not change the outcome of the negotiation (from agreement to disagreement or vice versa) in the majority of cases.
Seen in this light, the improvement in ￿t caused by the full model is quite large.
33markets and to providers in others. As the Director of Operations Analysis in one hospital chain
put it:
"There are counteracting e⁄ects here: the outcome [of any plan decision, like exclud-
ing a particular hospital] depends on where the balance of power lies."
This makes sense in light of the estimation results. Hospitals are likely to dominate both in
very low-capacity markets and in areas where many hospitals have merged to form systems. (In
Salt Lake city, for example, two systems own six of the nine largest hospitals; we would expect
hospitals to have high leverage here.) Plan power should be high in high-capacity markets with
few systems.
9.2 Investment Incentives for Capacity Constrained Hospitals
"We￿ re ... following a ￿nancial model that creating a ticket scarcity is a bigger plus than a ticket
surplus. That should generate better revenue."
(Ted Leland, Stanford Athletic Director, on the University￿ s plans to decrease the capacity of its
football stadium from 85,000 to 50,026. Palo Alto Weekly, June 10 2005.)
The bene￿t that hospitals derive from capacity constraints implies a potential disincentive to
invest that may have negative welfare e⁄ects69. Organizations outside the medical care market
(such as Stanford University) have been observed to respond to similar incentives by signi￿cantly
reducing the capacity of their facilities. Rational hospitals may well do the same if the potential
pro￿t e⁄ects are su¢ ciently strong. I examine this issue both in general and for three speci￿c
hospitals that are predicted to be capacity constrained: St. Luke￿ s Medical Center in Milwaukee
WI, SW Texas Hospital in San Antonio TX, and South Austin Hospital in Austin TX. For each I
calculate the change in consumer surplus, plan pro￿ts and hospital pro￿ts that the model predicts
would occur if the capacity constraints were removed.
Of course the removal of capacity constraints could a⁄ect plans￿network choices. The model in
this paper cannot predict the new equilibrium outcome for contracts since as mentioned I do not
69The estimates imply that capacity constrained hospitals receive higher pro￿ts per patient than other providers,
all else equal. In this section I consider whether they also receive higher total pro￿ts, indicating an incentive to
under-invest in new beds. There are at least two reasons why this is possible, both of which are discussed in Section
5. First, capacity constraints may improve the hospital￿ s ability to negotiate the selective contracts it needs to price
discriminate successfully. Second, the constraints may alter the nature of the bargaining game in the hospital￿ s favor.
34fully detail how a single con￿guration of hospital networks is chosen from the multiple potential
equilibria. In addition the change could lead to investment by other hospitals or to entry or
exit. The model cannot predict such developments. I therefore do not attempt a full analysis
of the new equilibrium. I limit myself to a simple outline of the impact of the change if plans￿
choices of networks and all other market characteristics were ￿xed. Even this requires an additional
assumption: that the institutional changes do not a⁄ect the reduced form function used to describe
hospital markups70. While not entirely realistic this enables me to derive at least an approximate
estimate of magnitudes. Finally, I also assume ￿xed premiums throughout the calculation.
The consumer surplus calculation ￿nds the dollar value of consumers￿ gain in utility when
reallocation of patients from full hospitals to other, less-preferred providers is no longer necessary.
















ijm is the utility a consumer with perfect foresight would expect to receive from
the hospital network given the probability of reallocation away from the full hospital, EU
nocapcon
ijm is
the expected utility for the network when the capacity constraints are removed, and ￿1 and ￿i are
the coe¢ cients on the expected utility from the network and premium in the plan demand equation
respectively71.
The plan pro￿t calculation uses the expression for pro￿ts given by equation (4). The pro￿t










jm (Hj;H￿j) is calculated using the parameter estimates in Table 10 and ￿
nocapcon
jm (Hj;H￿j)
sets the values for capacity constrained hospitals to zero. I adjust Sjm(Hj;H￿j) and Njhm(Hj;H￿j)
for the reallocation of patients across hospitals when the capacity constraints are removed. The
70I assume a value of 5.5 for the constant in the markup term, implying zero average pro￿ts for non-system,
non-capacity constrained hospitals.
71I assume that consumers do not have perfect foresight: they choose their plan under the belief that they can
access any hospital on its list. The utility reduction from capacity constraints is caused when consumers realize a
lower utility from the network than they expected. I multiply by
￿1
￿i to convert from utils into dollars. Note that, in
all three speci￿c examples, only one hospital in the market is predicted to be capacity constrained.
35change in hospital pro￿ts is calculated similarly. The reported results for plan pro￿ts include all
plans in the market; the hospital calculation includes just the capacity constrained hospital.
The results are set out in Table 12. The ￿rst row gives the median e⁄ect of investment to remove
all hospital capacity constraints; the e⁄ects for three speci￿c hospitals are then listed separately.
The results are most easily understood by considering the speci￿c examples which are reasonably
representative of the overall data. The ￿rst two hospitals considered, St. Luke￿ s in Milwaukee
and SW Texas Methodist Hospital in San Antonio, are large providers with signi￿cant high-tech
services: each has over 700 beds. In both cases the model predicts that the removal of capacity
constraints would have a substantial positive e⁄ect on consumer surplus: increases of $0.13 and
$0.31 per person per new bed per year respectively. These ￿gures translate to bene￿ts of $228,000
and $469,000 per additional bed per market per year. The e⁄ects on producer surplus are smaller.
The loss in hospital markups from reduced bargaining power outweighs the increased revenue from
new patients and implies that both hospitals would lose money from the change (even if it involved
zero investment): the losses are $21,635 and $13,322 per year per additional bed respectively. Plans
in Milwaukee would experience a very small pro￿t increase of $792 per bed per year; those in San
Antonio would see a slightly larger pro￿t increase of $21,700 per bed per year. The third example
is somewhat di⁄erent and is representative of a second type of hospital that the model predicts to
be capacity constrained. South Austin hospital is a smaller suburban provider with fewer high-tech
services, just 182 beds, and lower costs of care than its competitors. In this case the consumer
surplus estimates translate to a $326,000 bene￿t to consumers per year per additional bed. The
hospital￿ s low costs imply that plan pro￿ts would increase by a much higher $49,000 per year per
new bed and hospital pro￿ts would actually increase if the capacity constraints were removed.
Overall, then, the results have three implications. First, the bene￿t to consumers of removing
hospital capacity constraints is large: a median bene￿t of over $330,000 per year for each new bed
provided. The available data on the average cost of new hospital capacity implies a payback period
of less than two years when the impact on consumers is taken into account72. Second, plan pro￿ts
72Discussions with the COOs of several hospitals in the markets considered imply a capital cost of approximately
$350,000 per new bed, assuming that a new wing is needed to house the new capacity, and sta¢ ng costs of around
$65,000 per bed per year. Of course additional investment may be needed to maintain the quality of services provided
by these hospitals. However, as indicated by the three speci￿c examples considered here, the hospitals predicted to
be capacity constrained are not in general the very high-tech providers in the data. Even including this investment
in quality, the payback period is likely to be short.
36increase as a result of the change even if premiums are assumed ￿xed. Any premium increases
would further increase the bene￿t to plans: for example, an increase of 10 cents per person per
year for each new bed would generate a median total gain in plan revenues (across all plans in the
market) of around $165,000 per new bed per year73. Finally, however, hospitals on average face
a decrease in total pro￿ts if they invest to remove their capacity constraints74. Of course these
￿gures are approximate: the calculation uses ￿gures that are not precisely estimated and relies on
a number of simplifying assumptions. However, when put together with the estimates showing the
positive e⁄ect of capacity constraints on per-patient pro￿ts, the results send a strong message. The
contractual process between plans and hospitals generates hospital investment incentives that are
at odds with patient preferences.
10 Discussion and Conclusion
The analyses in this paper demonstrate some of the causes of the observed hospital-insurer networks
at the ￿rm level. Four factors are important: consumer demand for a particular hospital; hospital
costs of care; expected capacity constraints; and the existence of hospital systems. Together these
rationalize the majority of the observed contracts and those that are not observed.
The full model for estimation assumes that hospitals make simultaneous o⁄ers to plans and
that the price has both ￿xed and variable components. It then simply imposes Nash equilibrium
conditions to estimate the parameters. Previous papers have modeled the negotiation in more
detail than the very simple framework used here but have not accounted for some of the hospital
characteristics that this paper shows are important. The results given here can therefore help
determine which bargaining models best describe the hospital-health plan price negotiation; that
is an additional contribution of this paper.
The estimates also relate to a fairly substantial literature on the challenges faced by HMOs
73The bene￿t to each individual plan is much smaller, however: an average of $14,000 per new bed per year if
premiums increased by 10 cents per person. This small bene￿t, which implies a more than 20 year payback period for
plans, explains why the prospect of pro￿table investment in new capacity does not in general lead to vertical mergers.
74Of course these hospitals do not have negative incentives to invest overall: in fact they would bene￿t from
increasing their number of beds as long as they remained capacity constrained. The results imply a disincentive to
invest in new beds beyond this point, since the hospital￿ s threat to turn down low price o⁄ers then ceases to be
credible. This implies an incentive to under-invest in capacity for three reasons: because the credibility of the threat
increases with the extent of the capacity constraint; because hospitals are probably unable to predict future demand
accurately; and because they prefer not to have enough beds to handle positive shocks to demand.
37and POS plans in controlling costs. The original rationale for managed care was that the threat of
selective contracting could be used as a lever to prevent hospitals demanding high prices. A number
of recent papers have set out interview and other evidence suggesting that health plans￿leverage
has declined in recent years prompting them to move away from selective contracting towards
o⁄ering more choice75. The major causes of the reduced leverage suggested by these papers are a
rising consumer demand for choice and an extensive consolidation of hospitals resulting in increased
provider market power. Capacity constraints are also mentioned as a source of hospital leverage.
The evidence set out in my ￿rst paper (Ho 2005a) supports the ￿rst hypothesis: consumers do have
a signi￿cant preference for choice. If this has developed recently, in response to experience of the
restrictions imposed by managed care, it explains some of the move away from selective contracts.
The results of this paper are among the ￿rst to support the other two hypotheses. Without access to
data on actual prices paid it is impossible to know whether the reduced form function estimated here
has changed as a result of plans￿selective contracting: that is, whether high-priced hospitals would
demand even more if no plans turned them down. However, I do show that hospitals in systems
and those that expect to be full are the most often excluded when the surplus they generate is
positive, consistent with the theory that they have the highest leverage. Further research would be
useful, particularly in a setting where price data was available, to investigate these issues in more
detail.
The ￿nal implication of this paper relates to welfare. I demonstrate an important consequence
of the contractual process: the high pro￿ts captured by capacity constrained hospitals imply an
incentive to under-invest in capacity that could translate to a signi￿cant loss to consumers. Plan
incentives are somewhat better aligned with consumer preferences but are less relevant given that
hospitals, not insurers, are the organizations required to make the investment. While the analysis
involves a number of assumptions that limit the accuracy with which these welfare e⁄ects can be
measured, the potential distortion to provider incentives is clear enough to merit further research.
75See for example Lesser and Ginsburg (2001) and Lesser, Ginsburg and Davis (2003).
38References
1. Andrews, D., Berry, S., and Jia, P. (2004), "Con￿dence Regions for Parameters in Discrete
Games with Multiple Equilibria, with an Application to Discount Chain Store Location",
working paper.
2. Berry, S., Levinsohn, J., and Pakes, A. (1995), "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium",
Econometrica, 60(4), 889-917.
3. Brooks, J., Dor, A., and Wong, H., (1996), "Hospital-insurer bargaining: An empirical inves-
tigation of appendectomy pricing", Journal of Health Economics, 16, 417-434.
4. Burns, L., and Pauly, M., (2002), "Integrated Delivery Networks: A Detour on the Road to
Integrated Health Care?", Health A⁄airs, 21(4), 128-143.
5. Burns, L., and Thorpe, D., (2001), "Why provider-sponsored health plans don￿ t work",
Healthcare Financial Management: 2001 Resource Guide, 12-16.
6. Capps, C., and Dranove, D., (2004), "Hospital Consolidation and Negotiated PPO Prices",
Health A⁄airs; 23(2), 175-181.
7. Capps, C., Dranove, D. and Satterthwaite, M., (2003), "Competition and Market Power in
Option Demand Markets", RAND Journal of Economics, 34(4), 737-763.
8. Ciliberto, F., and Tamer, E., (2004), "Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in the Airline
Industry", Princeton and North Carolina State University Working Paper.
9. Cutler, D., McClellan, M. and Newhouse, J., (2000), "How Does Managed Care Do It?",
RAND Journal of Economics, 31(3), 526-548.
10. Eggleston, K., Norman, G., and Pepall, L., (2004), "Pricing Coordination Failure and Health
Care Provider Integration", Berkeley Electronic Press, 3(1), Article 20.
11. Feldman, R. and Wholey, D., (2001), "Do HMOs Have Monopsony Power?", International
Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 1(1), 7-22.
12. Fox, J., (2005), "Nonparametric Estimation of Matching Games Without a Curse of Dimen-
sionality", working paper.
13. Gal-Or, E., (1997), "Exclusionary Equilibria in Health Care Markets", Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy, 6(1), 5-43.
14. Gal-Or, E., (1999), "Mergers and Exclusionary Practices in Health Care Markets", Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy, 8(3), 315-350.
15. Ho, K. (2005a), "The Welfare E⁄ects of Restricted Hospital Choice in the US Medical Care
Market", forthcoming, Journal of Applied Econometrics.
16. Ho, K. (2005b), "Essays on the Industrial Organization of Medical Care", Harvard University
Dissertation.
17. Kaiser Family Foundation Report, "Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care
Marketplace, 2004 Update".
3918. Kreps, D. and Scheinkman, J., (1983), "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition
yield Cournot Outcomes", Bell Journal, 14, 326-337.
19. Lesser, C. and Ginsberg, P., (2001), "Back to the Future? New Cost and Access Challenges
Emerge", Center for Studying Health System Change Issue Brief No. 35.
20. Lesser, C., Ginsberg, P. and Devers, K., (2003), "The End of an Era: What Became of the
"Managed Care Revolution" in 2001?", Health Services Research, 38(1), Part II, 337-355.
21. Manning, W., Newhouse, J., Duan, N., Keeler, E., Leibowitz, A., and Marquis, M., (1987),
"Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experi-
ment", American Economic Review, 77(3), 251-277.
22. Mays, G., Hurley, R., and Grossman, J., (2003), "An Empty Toolbox? Changes in Health
Plans￿Approaches for Managing Costs and Care", Health Services Research, 38(1), Part II,
375-393.
23. McFadden, D. (1973), "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior", in P.
Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics, 105-142, Academic Press, New York.
24. Miller, R. and Luft, H., (1997), "Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of
Care?", Health A⁄airs, 16(5), 7-25.
25. Pakes, A., Porter, J., Ho, K. and Ishii, J., (2005), "The Method of Moments with Inequality
Constraints", working paper.
26. Seim, K., (2001), "Spatial Di⁄erentiation and Market Structure: The Video Retail Industry",
Yale University Dissertation.
27. Sorensen, M., (2005), "How Smart is Smart Money? An Empirical Two-Sided Matching Model
of Venture Capital", working paper.
28. Town, R. and Vistnes, G., (2001), "Hospital competition in HMO networks", Journal of
Health Economics, 20, 733-753.
29. Vistnes, G., (2000), "Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition", Antitrust Law Jour-
nal, 67, 671-692.
30. Zwanziger, J. and Mooney, C., (2000), "What Factors In￿ uence the Prices Negotiated by
HMOs and Hospitals?", Paper for the Seventh Northeast Regional Economics Research Sym-
posium.
40Figure 1: Variation in Plan Networks Across and Within Markets
This ￿gure summarizes the variation in selectivity of plans￿hospital networks both across and
within markets. Markets are categorized on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the least selective.
Category De￿nition Number Examples
of markets
1 The 5 largest plans (by enrollment) contract with
all 8 largest hospitals (by number of admissions)
5 San Antonio
TX; Atlanta GA
2 One plan excludes at least one hospital 10 Boston MA;
Columbus OH
3 Two plans exclude at least one hospital or three
plans exclude exactly one hospital each
6 Detroit MI; San
Francisco CA
4 Three plans exclude at least one hospital; one of
them excludes more than one
13 Houston TX;
Miami FL




























Graph 2: Number of major hospitals excluded by each plan in selective markets
(dark bars; categories 4-5 in the table above) compared to unselective markets

























41Figure 2: Simulated Distribution of Coe¢ cients, Full Model
42Figure 3: Simulated Distribution of Constant in Markup Equation
43Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Hospitals
Mean Standard Deviation
Number of beds (set up and sta⁄ed) 338.66 217.19
Teaching status 0.195 0.397
For-pro￿t 0.202 0.401
Registered nurses per bed 1.263 0.498
Cardiac services 0.812 0.310
Imaging services 0.539 0.287
Cancer services 0.647 0.402
Birth services 0.857 0.348
Notes: N = 665 hospitals. Cardiac, imaging, cancer and birth services refer to four summary
variables de￿ned in Table 4. Each hospital is rated on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that
no procedures in this category are provided by the hospital, and a higher rating indicates that a
less common service is o⁄ered.
44Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for HMO/POS Plans
Variable De￿nition N Mean Standard
Deviation
Market Share Plan share of non-elderly market 516 0.03 0.04
Premium
pmpm ($)




number of physician contracts per 1000




% of women aged 52-69 who received a




% of adult women who received pap




% of new mothers receiving a check-up









% of children receiving all required doses





% of children receiving all required doses










% of members seen as outpatient within
30 days of discharge after hospitalizn for
mental illness
307 0.68 0.15
Care quickly Composite measure of member satisfac-
tion re: getting care as soon as wanted
304 0.75 0.05
Care needed Composite measure of member satis-
faction re: getting authorizations for
needed/desired care
304 0.72 0.06
Age 0-2 Dummy for plans aged 0 - 2 years 516 0.01 0.08
Age 3-5 Dummy for plans aged 3 - 5 years 516 0.06 0.23
Age 6-9 Dummy for plans aged 6 - 9 years 516 0.17 0.37
Aetna Plan ￿xed e⁄ect 516 0.15 0.36
CIGNA Plan ￿xed e⁄ect 516 0.10 0.31
Kaiser Plan ￿xed e⁄ect 516 0.03 0.16
Blue Cross
Blue Shield
Dummy for ownership by BCBS 516 0.16 0.36
POS plan Dummy for POS plan 516 0.35 0.49
45Table 3: Summary Data for Selective and Unselective Markets
Unselective Markets Selective Markets p-value for
(Category 1 and 2) (Category 4 and 5) di⁄erence
Mean (std devn) Mean (std devn) in means
Market population (million) 2.36 (1.11) 2.36 (1.96) 1.00
Number of HMO/POS plans with over
1% market share
6.80 (1.70) 6.57 (1.89) 0.71
Number of hospitals 19.80 (11.40) 21.24 (20.53) 0.78
Beds per 1000 population 2.78 (1.00) 2.90 (0.99) 0.74
Managed care penetration 0.33 (0.17) 0.35 (0.15) 0.66
Average age of population 34.76 (2.19) 34.31 (1.39) 0.49
% of under-65 population aged 55-64 0.09 (0.01) 0.09 (0.01) 0.75
Median total family income of popu-
lation
$48,890 ($8,460) $46,130 ($8,642) 0.35
Std devn of total family income of
population
$53,687 ($9,805) $52,797 ($6,511) 0.76
Mean distance between hospitals
(miles)
11.71 (5.60) 13.41 (5.12) 0.36
Std devn of distances between hospi-
tals (miles)
7.67** (3.37) 10.30** (4.06) 0.04
No. hospitals with open heart surgery 8.07 (3.67) 10.19 (8.59) 0.31
N 15 21
46Table 4: De￿nition of Hospital Services
This Table sets out the de￿nition of the hospital service variables summarized in Table 1.
Hospitals were rated on a scale from 0 to 1 within four service categories, where 0 indicates that
no services within this category are provided by the hospital, and a higher rating indicates that
less common (assumed to be higher-tech) service in the category is o⁄ered. The categories are
cardiac, imaging, cancer and births. The services included in each category are listed in the
following table.
Cardiac Imaging Cancer Births
1. Cardiac catheterization lab 1. Ultrasound 1. Oncology services 1. Obstetric care
2. Cardiac Intensive Care 2. CT scans 2. Radiation therapy 2. Birthing room
3. Angioplasty 3. MRI
4. Open heart surgery 4. SPECT
5. PET
The exact methodology for rating hospitals is as follows. If the hospital provides none of the
services, its rating = 0. If it provides the least common service, its rating = 1. If it o⁄ers some
service X but not the least common service, its rating = (1 - x) / (1 - y), where x = the percent of
hospitals o⁄ering service X and y = the percent of hospitals o⁄ering the least common service.
47Table 5: Relation of Hospital Characteristics to Market Shares
Coe¢ cient estimate Coe¢ cient estimate
Cardiac services 0.732** (0.104) 0.676** (0.072)
Imaging services 0.233** (0.107) 0.224** (0.074)
Cancer services 0.158** (0.079 0.299** (0.054)
Birth services 0.507** (0.082) 0.394** (0.056)
Teaching hospital 0.243** (0.074) 0.461** (0.051)
Constant -4.484** (0.097) -0.005 (0.007)
Market FEs? No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.69
Notes: Regression of the log of hospital market shares on hospital characteristics. N = 633
hospitals (the 665 providers in the full dataset less 14 Kaiser hospitals and 18 hospitals in
Baltimore MD that were excluded from the supply-side analysis). Standard errors are reported in
parentheses; **signi￿cant at p=0.05; *signi￿cant at p=0.1. Cardiac, imaging, cancer and birth
services refer to the four hospital service variables de￿ned in Table 4.
48Table 6: Results of Plan Demand Estimation
Coe¢ cient Estimate
Premium ($00 pmpm) -0.94 (1.13)
Expected utility from hospital network (EUrepjm or EUijm) 0.59** (0.21)
Premium ($00 pmpm) / Income ($000 per year) 0.002 (43.9)
Physicians per 1000 population 0.21** (0.09)
Breast cancer screening -0.38 (2.66)
Cervical cancer screening 4.40** (2.09)
Check-ups after delivery 0.18 (1.38)
Diabetic eye exams -1.19 (1.60)
Adolescent immunization 1 -4.11** (1.17)
Adolescent immunization 2 3.08 (3.76)
Advice on smoking 6.17** (2.08)
Mental illness check-ups 2.70** (1.30)
Care quickly 0.78 (5.63)
Care needed 0.85 (3.99)
Plan age: 0 - 2 years 1.36 (0.97)
Plan age: 3 - 5 years -0.64 (1.97)
Plan age: 6 - 9 years -0.25 (0.58)
POS plan -1.11** (0.13)
Constant -10.50* (5.65)
Large plan ￿xed e⁄ects Yes
Market ￿xed e⁄ects Yes
Notes: N=559 plans. Standard errors (adjusted for the three-stage estimation process) are
reported in parentheses. ** signi￿cant at p=0.05; * signi￿cant at p=0.1.
49Table 7: E⁄ect of Producer Surplus on Contract Probability
Number of ￿Surplus ￿ 0 ￿Surplus < 0
contracts
Contract observed 5587 68.2% 31.8%
Contract not observed 1160 61.4% 38.6%
Notes: Number of plan-hospital pairs for which producer surplus would increase, be una⁄ected, or
decrease when the hospital was added, under the assumptions described in Section 4.2. For
example, the data predict an increase in producer surplus for 59.3 per cent of the 1160 contracts
that were not agreed.
Table 8: E⁄ect of Hospital Characteristics on Contract Probability
Coe¢ cient estimate Coe¢ cient estimate
System -0.159** (0.046) -0.160* (0.046)
Same system hospital -0.513** (0.120) -0.514** (0.020)
excluded
Cap constrained 1 -0.400** (0.149)
Cap constrained 2 -0.390** (0.084)
Constant 0.668** (0.121) 0.704** (0.121)
Market FEs? Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.218 0.220
Notes: Probit analysis to predict contracts using indicator variables for hospitals in systems and
capacity constrained hospitals. N=6747 contracts. Standard errors in parentheses; **signi￿cant at
p=0.05; *signi￿cant at p=0.1. "System" is an indicator variable for hospitals in systems. "Same
system hospital excluded" is the increase, when the contract is agreed, in the number of network
hospitals for which a same-system hospital is excluded by the plan. "Cap constrained 1" is an
indicator variable for hospitals that were over capacity in the previous year (that is, those with
admissions > 365 * number of beds / average length of stay in 2001). "Cap constrained 2" is an
indicator variable for hospitals that were over 85 per cent of capacity in the previous year.
50Table 9: Relation of Hospital Characteristics to Predicted Capacity
Constraints
Coe¢ cient estimate Coe¢ cient estimate
Cardiac services 0.919* (0.464) 1.253** (0.550)
Imaging services 0.772** (0.289) 0.986** (0.335)
Cancer services 0.014 (0.225) 0.015 (0.254)
Birth services 0.228 (0.285) 0.206 (0.317)
Teaching hospital 0.110 (0.192) 0.131 (0.220)
System 0.135 (0.179) 0.158 (0.205)
Distance from city center 0.001 (0.008) -0.001 (0.008)
Constant -3.039** (0.496) -3.623** (0.726)
Market FEs? No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.13
Notes: Probit analysis to predict the "predicted capacity constraints" variable using hospital
characteristics. N = 633 hospitals (the 665 providers in the full dataset less 14 Kaiser hospitals
and 18 hospitals in Baltimore MD that were excluded from the supply-side analysis). Standard
errors in parentheses; **signi￿cant at p=0.05; *signi￿cant at p=0.1. The dependent variable is an
indicator for hospitals where the predicted number of patients, under the thought experiment that
every plan contracts with every hospital in the market, is greater than the number of beds*365 /
the average length of stay in the hospital in 2001.
51Table 10: Results of Full Model for Estimation
Hospital Characteristics Main US News Teaching Imaging
Speci￿cation Index Hospitals Services
Fixed Component (Unit = $ million per month)
Hospital in System 0.140 0.161 0.164 0.145
[0.07, 0.60] [0.11, 0.60] [0.05, 0.85] [0.07, 0.45]
Drop Same System Hospital 0.043 0.045 0.050 0.048
[0.01, 0.23] [0.02, 0.19] [0.00, 0.30] [0.02, 0.17]
Per patient Component (Unit = $ thousand per patient)
Constant 1.532 0.134 0.102 1.316
[-3.88, 11.72] [-0.80, 2.29] [-3.42, 11.35] [-5.37, 11.08]
Capacity Constrained 1.807 1.515 3.057 1.493
[0.32, 10.82] [-1.36, 10.16] [-0.43, 14.94] [0.75, 11.18]
Cost per Admission -0.494 -0.481 -0.497 -0.454
[-1.54, -0.33] [-1.39, -0.33] [-1.99, -0.36] [-1.27, -0.16]
US News Index 1.866
[-9.08, 7.69]
Teach*(1 - % other teach) 0.031
[-1.27, 0.70]
Imaging*(1 - % other imaging) 0.157
[-2.13, 0.76]
Notes: Results of the full model. N = 441 insurance plans (the 516 in the full dataset less 9 plans
in Baltimore MD, 13 Kaiser plans, 42 with unobserved premiums and 8 extremely selective plans
that I regard as outliers). 95 per cent con￿dence intervals in parentheses. The coe¢ cients
represent the predicted pro￿ts to the hospital: a positive coe¢ cient implies a positive relationship
to hospital pro￿ts. "Hospital in system" refers to whether the hospital is in a system; "Drop
Same System Hospital" refers to an indicator for hospitals for which a same-system hospital has
been excluded. Capacity constrained hospitals are those with predicted admissions (when all
plans contract with all hospitals) > number of beds * 365 / average length of stay. "US News
Index", "Teach*(1 - % other teach)" and "Imaging*(1 - % other imaging)" are the star hospital
measures discussed in Sections 7 and 8.
52Table 11: Robustness Tests
Hospital Characteristics Main Number Last Year Premium
Speci￿cation Enrollees Cap Con Adjustments
Enrollees 0.03
[-0.02, 0.11]
Fixed Component (Unit = $ million per month)
Hospital in System 0.140 0.323 0.343 0.198
[0.07, 0.60] [0.09, 0.42] [0.08, 0.62] [0.10, 0.64]
Drop Same System Hospital 0.043 0.116 0.131 0.023
[0.01, 0.23] [-0.03, 0.15] [0.02, 0.25] [0.01, 0.20]
Per patient Component (Unit = $ thousand per patient)
Constant 1.532 0.618 -0.632 0.008
[-3.88, 11.72] [0.08, 5.65] [-1.92, 10.73] [-0.16, 14.05]
Capacity Constrained 1.807 2.072 3.986
[0.32, 10.82] [-2.30, 5.10] [-4.31, 7.50]
Last Year Cap Constrained 1.130
[-6.35, 12.26]
Cost per Admission -0.494 -0.605 -0.331 -1.098
[-1.54, -0.33] [-1.18, -0.35] [-1.49, -0.14] [-2.25, -0.81]
Notes: Results of robustness tests. N = 441 insurance plans (the 516 in the full dataset less 9
plans in Baltimore MD, 13 Kaiser plans, 42 with unobserved premiums and 8 extremely selective
plans that I regard as outliers). 95 per cent con￿dence intervals in parentheses. The ￿rst test
includes the number of enrollees. The second replaces the predicted capacity constraints variable
with an indicator variable for capacity constraints in the previous year. Finally, the surplus
estimate is adjusted for premium changes in response to changes in network.
53Table 12: Investment Incentives for Capacity Constrained Hospitals
Example CS per person CS per market Plan pro￿t Hospital pro￿t
($ per bed ($ per bed ($ per bed ($ per bed
per year) per year) per year) per year)
Median $0.17 $331,890 $16,876 - $4,564
St. Luke￿ s $0.13 $227,710 $792 - $21,635
Milwaukee
SW Texas $0.31 $468,790 $21,677 - $13,322
Methodist
South Austin $0.33 $326,310 $49,071 $30,709
Hospital
Notes: This table shows the e⁄ect of investment to remove capacity constraints. The ￿rst row
gives the median e⁄ect (across markets) of investment to remove all hospital capacity constraints.
For some markets this involves investment in more than one hospital. Rows 2-4 list the e⁄ects for
three speci￿c hospitals: St. Luke￿ s Medical Center in Milwaukee WI, SW Texas Methodist
Hospital in San Antonio TX, and South Austin Hospital in Austin TX. All e⁄ects are given in $
per new bed per year. Plan pro￿t e⁄ects are listed as a sum over plans in the market; hospital
pro￿ts are given for the capacity constrained hospital alone.
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